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PREFACE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship be-
tween the possession of a high level of mi.lit .. ary power and the motivation 
of a state to use it to achieve critical political objectives. Particu-
lar attention is given to two general areas: First, the relationship 
between the recently acquired position of military power by India. and 
India's subsequent high motivation to use its power against Pakistan; 
second, the internal political conditions .during 1971 which were manip-
ulated by India's leadership to bolster the ruition I s war. potential to 
bring about a high motivation for war. The strategic perspective model 
for foreign policy analysis provided the general •nalytical frame of 
reference for the thesis~ 
I would like to thank Professor Harold Sare for stimulating my 
interest in the India-Pakistan war of 1971 and for providing a framework 
for methodological analysis and valuable r.es.earch material. For criti-
cism and suggestions, I am indebted to Dr. Clifford Rich and Dr. Raymond 
Habiby. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
War is one of the most serious concerns in international relations. 
The primacy of national self-interest and the function of military power 
as a factor in achieving national interests present basic problems in 
every nation's defense policy. The essence of a sound defense policy 
rests upon a well-defined set of vital national interests and the de-
velopment of sufficient power, alone or in concert with others, to se-
cure those interests. A particular defense policy at any time can be 
examined on this premise. In this study, the India-Pakistan wqr of 1971 
will be examined from this standpoint. 
Political conflict in East Pa~istan between a revolutionary group 
and the recognized government of Pakistan caused several million refugees 
to flee to India. This was because of alleged widespread "atrocities" 
and "massacres" inflicted on the inhabitants of East Pakistan by govern-
ment troops sent in to control the uprising. A severe strain was put on 
India's already embattled economy. Similarly, it caused additional 
problems for the central government of India in West Bengal, India's most 
troubled and turbulent state. 
In late November, 1971, India sent troops into East Pakistan in an 
attempt to redress the situation. The primary reason for this action 
was stated by Mrs. Indira Gandhi: 
1 
How could we ignore a conflict which took place on our very 
border and overflowed into our own territory? Ten million 
destitute refugees poured into densely populated areas which 
were also politically sensitive owing to the activities of 
Marxists and the Left extreminists we call Naxalites. This 
posed unbearable strains on our economy and on our social 
and administrative institutions. The terrible stories of 
genocide and the comings and goings of Mukti Bahini, the 
resistance force of Bangladesh, created a volatile situation 
for us also. How could we remain indifferent to these de-
velopments?l 
2 
This precipitated a war between India and Pakistan. India's preponderant 
military strength was quickly demonstrated and after only a few days of 
fighting, Indian officers were demanding a Pakistani surrender. Pakis-
tan's military force surrendered on the war's thirteenth day, thus 
closing a legendary fourteen day war. As a result of the war, the re-
fugees were returned to E~st Pakistan, now the new state of Bangladesh. 
The overall effects of the war were wide-spreaq. Pakistan lost a 
major portion of its population and territory. It also lost its main 
foreign exchange earners--jute and tea. The second partition of the 
subcontinent increased the possibility of revolution in the area because 
of wide-spread economic, political, and social unrest in Pakistan and in 
2 the new state of Bangladesh. Also, a new power alignment developed in 
the region--China and the United States in support of Pakistan, and the 
Soviet Union in support of India. 
Even though the United States stopped the shipment of war material 
3 4 to both India and Pakistan there is strong evidence to support the 
1 Indira Gandhi, "India and the World," Foreign Affairs (October, 
1972), P• 70. 
2Robert Laporte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a 
Nat ion," .Asian Survey (February, 197.2) , p • 107 • 
3 New York Times, Dec.ember 2, 1971, p. 1. 
4 Ibid., November 8, 1971, p. 1. 
3 
position that there was firm backing .of Pakistan by the United States. 
According to the text of a memorandum for a meeting of a National Secur-
ity Council Committee on Indian-Pakistani hostilities, Doctor Kissinger 
is reported by Jack Anderson, a syndicated Golumnist, to have taken the 
following position: 
Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even handed. 
· There can be no doubt what the president wants. The presi-
dent does not want to be even handed. The president believes 
that India is the attacker •••• Dr. Kissinger said that he can-
not afford to ease India's stai:e of mind •••• He invited anyone 
who objected to this approach to take his case to the presi-
dent.5 
Additionally, Mr. Anderson claimed possession of con'fidential docu-
ments which reveal that the United States sent elements of its Seventh 
Fleet to the Indian Ocean for a show of force in support of Pakistan 
rather than the announced "evacuation of American citizens •116 It was 
also asserted that some administration officials proposed to let Jordan 
..::., : 7 
or Saudi Arabia "quietly transfer" American furnished arms to Pakistan. 
8 China openly condemned India at the United Nations and pledged to 
"resolutely support the Pakistan government and people in their just 
struggle against foreign aggression and in defense of their state sover-
eignty and national independence.119 This warning was interpreted to re-
fleet a willingness to extend increased military assistance rather than 
to intervene directly by sending troops. 
5Ibid., January 15, 1972, P• 6. 
6Ibid., January 1, 1972, P• 2. 
7 . Ibid., December 31, 1971, P• 1. 
.8 November 20, 1971, 1. Ibid., P• 
9Ibid., November 29, 1971, P• 11. 
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The Soviets stood in firm support of India before and during the 
crisis. In August, 1971, a treaty of peace, cooperation and friendship 
with the Soviet Union was negotiated, which contained clauses calling 
for consultation in case of attack or th~eat thereof by a third party. 
Afterwards, high Soviet officials visited India and were "believed to 
have discussed Soviet military commitments to India in the event of an 
10 India-Pakistan war •11 
Mrs. Gandhi summed up the pow~r bloc alignment in the following 
statement: 
On American arms for Pakistan ••• I don't know what the quantum 
is now but in the past they have been supplied to Pakistan 
in large quantities. They have been used only against India 
•••• In this matter we certainly have had a far more under-
standing approach from the Soviet Union than we have from the 
United States •••• The point is that the Soviet Union supports 
us in basic things for which we have stood and for which we 
have fought earlier on. And it is on thes1 issues that we 
have been with them at the United Nations. 1 
This thesis is concerned with the underlying factors leading to 
India's involvement in the war. Primarily, it will explore why India 
sent troops into East Pakistan under the guise of defensive strikes when 
it could have chosen to avoid a formal military involvement and have 
achieved the same objectives. David Bayley argues that had India w.aited, 
the independence of Bangladesh woul.d. st.i 11 have taken place. He asserts 
that Pakistan's military machinery, administrative capacity, and fi-
12 
nancial position could not have tolerated the situation much longer. 
lOibid., O_ctober 29, 1971, P• 10. 
11Ibid., October 19, 1971, P• 1. 
12 David H. Bayley, "India: War and Political Assertion," Asian 
Survey, Vol. XIII (February, 1972), p. 94. 
5 
An analysis of the "cost-gain" .estimates. that may have contributed to 
India's decision to use force and how its mi.litary power was related to 
the motivation to use force will be made. 
Military power will be treated. as .a vital resource of political 
power, as an instrument for India to achieve.objectives that were ranked 
high in the structure of goals that were p.olitically effective at that 
time. This will involve a discussion of India's forceful action as a 
specific response to a particular .situation. The motivating factor was 
the expected effects of war on the goals .and preferences of India. The-
greater the net gain which India expected to derive from fighting, the 
~~gher was its motivation for war. 
Historically, poLitical attitudes in India toward military power 
before the 1962 war with China corresponded with Nehru's belief that a 
Chinese military threat to India was dist.ant and that India should not 
stimulate a provocative response from China through reckless actions. 
Thus, India's military preparedness was directed against her weaker 
neighbor, Pakistan. Its military had put great stress on traditional 
British ceremonies and had given little attention to the capacity of its 
forces to carry out successful campaigns against an enemy other than 
Pakistan. Its officer corps was'misled by the politicians in believing 
that there was no serious threat from China. Prime Minister Nehru, 
speaking in bewilderment after the Chinese invasion, is reported to have 
said that: "He felt that this type of aggression was almost a thing of 
13 the past." 
13Lorne J. Kavic, India I s Quest for Security: Defense Policies 
1947-1965 (Berkeley, 1967), p. 178. 
The attack caught India .short in every categO-fY. Vital supplies 
and material were in short supp.Ly .and. materials had to be sought from 
the general pubLi.c to aid d-efensel.ess s.oldiers. 14 The Indian economy 
6 
15 
was disrupted and all steel products and corporate stock were frozen. 
The Chinese attacks were heavy .and decisive. Indian forces were beaten 
on fronts one thousand miles apart and we:r:e.overrun in the eastern drive. 
Having gained all of the border regions they had claimed, the Chinese 
suddenly declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew to lines from 
which they could control these regions. An informal truce prevailed be-
16 
cause the Indians had no desire to renew the war. Although the con-
flict had ended, Peking continued to make political advances to the Him-
alayan states of Nepal and Bhutan in an attempt to erode India I s in-
fluence. This added to India's problem of defending her two thousand 
eight hundred mile border broken only by several pow,erless kingdoms. 
This conflict had a marked effect on Indian official circles. It 
showed that if vital interests are at stake, the balance of pow.er thesis 
does not preclude a limited conflict in which an aggressor can initiate 
hostilities and terminate action after achieving the desired objectives, 
and then resume its pre-conflict military posture without interference. 
l'his same principle was used by India in the war with Pakistan in 1971. 
The major hypothesis of this study is: India resorted to force 
against Pakistan in East Pakistan because it envisioned an opportunity, 
with the supp.ort of. the Soviet Union, to become pol.itically and 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid.,. p. 179. 
16 Ernest and Trevor Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History 
(New Yark,_ 1970), pp. 1245, .1246. 
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militarily dominant in South Asia. Under the cloak of "self-defense," 
India desired to eliminate the long term military threat of Pakistan and 
to build a security system that could stand against any possible advance 
into the region by the People's Republic of China. Its motivation to 
use force was high because it had suffered a traumatic military defeat 
in the 1962 war with China and had subsequently connnitted its resources 
to the development of military power. The East Pakistan problem offered 
an opportunity to assert this power. A hi.gh level of military capability 
combined w.ith expectant major net gains from fighting provided a strong 
motivation for war. Also, India I s leadership responded forcefully in 
East Pakistan to prevent elements in West. Bengal from jdining the Bangla 
movement and possibly taking West Bengal out of the Indian nation. 
The methodology of this study w-ill be analytical and descriptive. 
Chapter II will show that India, by receiving considerable military as-
sistance from the United States, the Soviet Union, and other common-
wealth nations, attempted to revitalize her armed forces and remedy the 
many defects disclosed in the disastrous 1962 war with China. With this 
introduction, India's military power will then be compared to Pakistan's 
military pow;er before the 1971 war, showing the lop-sided pow;er position 
that existed at that time. If India had not been able to quickly defeat 
Pakistan, it may have gotten itself into a prolonged war. It becomes 
necessary to look at the sustaining power of both countries. War-useful 
resources and industries of both countries will be compared and,ana,-
lyzed. Klause Knorr relates a nation's potential military output to 
motivation for war. He states the following: 
Motivation for war in part determines the proportion of the 
nation's economic capacity whi,ch', in the event of war, will 
be available for producing military power and the efficiency 
with which resources will be employed. The more economic 
resources are drawn from idleness into production, and the 
more efficiently all em~loyed resources are put. to work, 
the larger will be the output of military power.17 
8 
It will be shown that India I s potential military output greatly exceeded 
that of Pakistan. Some of the factors that will be studied are popula-
tion, energy production, heavy industry, and defense production. These 
provide an overall index of the strength th1:1,t could be mobilized by the 
"( 
two countries. 
Chapter II.Lwil.1 discuss the overall effects of the unstable mili-
tary balance in South Asia and the advanta~es created for India by its 
I 
decisive intervention in the 1971 war.. The focus of attention will be 
on India's "cost-gain" estimates and its attempt to build an acceptable 
Inda-Pakistani relationshif• 
By eliminating the military threat of Pakistan with Soviet assist-
ance, India can now focus its planning and military preparations against 
its major opponent, the People's Republic of China. Also, by fully sup-
porting the hard pressed New Congress government in West Bengal, the 
central government took long strides toward stability in the Indian 
union. 
Having shown, in Chapters II and III, India's psychological comnit-
ment to power through the development of her war potential and that it 
had vital interests at stake, Chapter IV will relate these two factors 
as motivation for war. Three indicators from Klaus Knorr's discussion 
on the war potential of nations will be applied to test whether 
17 Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton, 1956), p. 
43. 
9 
. . f . d 18 motivation or war existe •. It will be shown that through carefully 
orchestrated actions and speeches, Indian officials clearly "demon-
strated" that vital interests were at stake and a "benevolent" India was 
being forced into a war it did not want, thus. justifying its subsequent 
actions. The following factors will be used: 
It is through the political process that a motivation for 
war expresses itself. By means of an adroit policy of 
information, the government can assist citizens in gaining 
a picture of reality which is conducive to a high personal 
commitment to wage war. The way government leaders repre-
sent a war effort will in etfect limit the individual's 
choice and guide his response.19 
The Indian administration's policy of information will be appraised in 
terms of how it assisted its citizens in gaining a picture of the war 
and how it limited their choice and response to the war. 
To help clarify this argument, Knorr states the folloW'ing: 
The power of leadership is founded on the degree to which 
the nation among its parts and with the government is agreed 
on its most cherished interests. A shift in preference and 
goals come about as individuals and groups identify them-
selves with the nation's milit.ary objectives and with those 
governmental leaders and groups who are representative of 
this cause. In that event, and to that extent, individuals 
want the consequenCEi\S of 26ighting more than the conse-
quences of not fighting. 
Mrs. Gandhi and her lieutenants asserted a strong leadership position 
during the crisis. It will be shown that Indian leaders began cultiva-
ting the need to redress the situation in March, 1971, by favorably re-
sponding to the hordes of destitute refugees and, at the same time, 
pointing to the burden that the refugees brought to India. War was made 
18Ibid., P• 310. 
19Ibid., PP• 64, 81, 82. 
20Ibid. ,. PP• 74, 75, 85. 
desirable in economic ·.terms. The Indian public w:as ski llf.ully di.sci-
plined to war in December, 1971. 
A natiop' s potential motivation for war must be appraised 
relative to the scale of war effort which its government 
deems necessary.as a means of achieving its military ob-
jectives and partly on the citizenry's app~aisal of the· 
prospects of winning. A nation will be motivated to be 
an aggressor when it can force a decision before the 
enemy has had time to mobilize his war pot~ntial, or when 
it can at least cripple. hi.s war potential at the outset 
of war.21 
10 
India's preponderant military power during the crisis will be analyzed. 
It will be shown that Indian leadership felt that India could achieve a 
"decisive" and "final" victory. The last chapter will present conclu.-
sions in response to the major hypothesis. 
A search of the literature reveals that there are several articles 
written on the 1971 war. Most of the authors focus on the political in-
stability in India and Pakistan as causes of the war. Articles written 
by David Bayley and Robert Laporte are excellent examples of the general 
approach selected by most writers on the subject. 
David Baylay discusses the Indian forceful response to the refugee 
problem as premature and unwarranted. He implies that India could have 
i. 
achieved the same objectives through more peac~ful measures. He de-
scribes the war as a major political feat for the Indian leaders during 
a period of intense political instability in the country. His major 
contribution is a brief description of the s:trategy played by India 
22 during the crisis. 
Robert Laporte focuses on the political instability in Pakistan 
21Ibid., p. 44 •. 
22 Bayley, PP• .87-96. 
11 
before the war. He discusses the cause of the w.ar as a response from 
the people o f East Pakistan to the rep.ressive order of their govern-
ment. He implies that the government officials of Pakistan were re-
sponsible for the tragic dismemberment of the country. In conclusion, 
he offers an analysis of the increased instability in the region as a 
23 
result of the war. 
This study' s approach, which is essentially a power approach, puts 
a sense of realism into the problem, which is ignored by the other 
articles, or at most only implicitly mentioned. 
This study will provide insights into general political concepts 
useful in analyzing a nation's foreign policy. First, it will provide 
a framework for clarifying two of the most relevant factors which in-
fluence a nation's foreign policy--capability and will to fight. Second, 
this study presents a model, influenced by Klaus Knorr's approach, for 
comparing the foreign policies of nations. Third, and most important, 
this study will show significant relationships among the several factors 
which influence the decision of a nation to go to war. Not only can the 
behavior of a nation in conflict with another nation be related to in-
ternal political instability and historical grievances, but it can also 
be related to national power, military power, psychological motivation, 
national unity, and the intensity of border disputes. 
This paper will depend upon such sources as The New York Times, The 
-,-- -- -
Christian Science Monitor, political science journals, military journals, 
United Nat ions technical journals and reports, and numerous books con-
cerning both countries. 
23 LaPorte, PP• 97-108. 
CHAPTER II 
INDIA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP 
After the 1962 war with China, India was faced with a grave defense 
problem. The war had been of great psychological consequence to the 
Indian leaders. Following the defeat, Indian leadership made a conunit-
ment not to let this happen again. Prime Minister Nehru said: 
We can safeguard peace only when we have the strength to make 
aggression a costly and profitless adventure. The greater 
our economic and defense potential, the less will be the 
danger from across our borders. From now on, defense and 
development must be regarded as:, integral and related parts 
of the national economic plan.l 
Geographically, India is separated from China by the Himalayan 
mountains. The mountains serve as a natural barrier except for well-
defined passes that can be penetrated by the military. This defensive 
barrier is w.eakened by the existence of three small states which lie in 
the center of the frontier with China. These states, Napal, Bhutan, and 
Sikkim, offer direct passes from Tibet into India. The easy access that 
China had into India through these passes forced Indian leadership to 
develop ,special military relations with each state and to assist each in 
strengthening its military power in addition to overhauling India's own 
military strength. 
Before the 1947 partitioning of the subcontinent, Nepal provided a 
source of manpower for the British army in India. The men recruited 
lK . avic, P• 192. 
12 
13 
from this area were well known for: their military expertise and were 
used to form special Gurka regiments. After the subcontinent was par-
titioned, India entered into a security agreement with Nepal and provided 
arms and supplies to Nep.al's 25,500 man army and air force. India also 
recruited one additional Gurka reg.iment frotl:l. .this area to supplement the 
six regiments which were retained within the Indian army after the 1947 
partitioning. Even though the treaty was terminated by Nepal in 1969, 
India continued to provide military training for Nep,al I s military forces. 
Nepal's military forces were primarily used for internal security and 
2 border patro 1. 
Sikkim, a protectorate of India, permitted the Indian government to 
handle all foreign affairs and defense matters for the country. Sikkim's 
300 man army was reinforced by two Indian divisions which were permanent-
ly assigned to operate within that country. Indian interest in the area 
originated from the existence of strategic passes which began in Sikkim 
and passed through the Himilayan mountains into Tibet. Indian forces 
clashed with Chinese forces along these passes four times during the 
period 1963 to 1968. India built hard surface roads and an airfield 
3 
within Sikkim in order to improve its strategic position in the area. 
India aho provided similar military training and arms to Bhutan. 
A treaty signed in 1949 between India and Bhutan provided for military 
aid and training for Bhutan's 5,000 man army. In 1958 China renewed 
claims to Bhutanese territory. India, consequently, built four new 
roads and an airfield for the forward deployment of Indian troops in the 
2 T. N. Dupuy and W. Blanchard, The Almanac of World Military Power 
(2nd ed., New York and London, 1972), p. 324. 
3Ibid., p. 328. 
14 
event of an attack by Chinese forces in the area. 4 
The military assistance provided to these three countries was com-
plemented with an internal military build-up of Indian forces. Military 
equipment needed to equip the increased number of active duty military 
personnel was received from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
United Kingdom. Indian leaders reduced the political pressure which of-
ten accompanied military and economic aid by maintaining a diversity of 
aid contributors. This also allowed the Indian leaders to proclaim a 
policy of non-alignment with the major powers. This policy was influ-
enced by India's geographical location and the east-west cold war rival-
ry. 
The expansion of Indian military forces called for an increase in 
military personnel, equipment and defense industries. The plan as out-
lined in early 1964 by the Indian administration provided for .the follow-
ing objectives. 
1. Creation of an 825,000 man army and modernization of its wea..; 
pons and equipment; 
2. Stabilization of the air force at 45 squadrons, its re-equipment 
with modern aircraft, and provision of suitable ancillary facilities; 
3. Maintenance of the navy at approximately its existing strength 
and replacement of obsolete vessels with new vessels; 
4. Establishment of production facilities so as to materially re-
duce dependence on external sources of supply; 
5. Construction and improvement of communications in border areas. 
4Ibid., p. 309. 
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6. Expansion of the research organization. 5 
In October, 1962, the Indian anny consisted of 550,000 personnel 
and approximately 1,000 tanks. The tanks had be~n supplied by the 
United States, Britain, France, and West Ger:qiany. Other small arms wea-
pons, vehicles, and artillery were of World War II vintage. Prior to 
1962, tactical planning was conducted in response to the threat of Pak-
istan in the west and little or no attention was given to the Chinese 
threat in the northeast frontier area. This area was primarily defended 
by small outposts. There were no man-made obstacles, ammunition was in 
short supply, the troops were not acclimated to the 14,700 feet altitude, 
and warm clothing was absent. The officer corps was low in strength and 
morale, and it had little appreciation for logistical requirements .• 
After the hostilities in 1962, aid-seeking missions were dispatched 
to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union for vital 
· 1 · · 1 6 mi itary materia. The Soviet Union responded by providing various 
types of military hardware to include tanks, small arms, aircraft, and 
ships. It also provided military training for Indian military personnel 
within the S0viet Union and sent Soviet advisers to India to help train 
Indian military personnel. The United States also responded, but on a 
smaller scale than the Soviets. Its aid was primarily in terms of trans-
pot;t aircraft, air defense and control equipment and other small arms 
f . . 7 or mountain operations. 
The defense plan called for twenty-one army divisions, of which ten 
5K . avic, PP• 192, 193. 
6Ibid., p. 194. 
7 Dupuy and Blanchard, p. 318. 
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were to be mountain divisions, trained and equipped to fight in the Him-
alayan region. Training for these mountain divisions was reoriented ta 
emphasize tactical manuevers peculiar to the Ju-pg.Les .. and .. mountains found 
in the Himalayan region. The offi.ce.r corp.s. 1 prpgram of instruction was 
also reoriented in order to provide for greB;ter l<nowledge in operations 
and logistics. The objective was to• produce a professional officer with 
both mental and physical endurance. 
By 1971 th.e Indian army had grown to a professional force sixty per 
cent larger than its 1962 force in personnel and 100 per cent stronger 
in battle tanks. (.See Figures 1 and 2 of the Appendix). Moreover, by 
1971 the Indian army trebled the Pakistani army in mobilized personnel 
and possessed twice as many tanks. Thus, India had a superior capability 
ta .launch an attack against Pakistan and expand its existing force with 
greater ease than did Pakistan. A.large army has a greater capacity to 
expand rapidly because of the necessary equipment, personnel, training 
facilities and housing required to accommodate a large military force. 
India's naval defense plan called for both a modernization of obso-
lete vessels and the construction of shipyards within India. -The pro-
gram was initiated'. with a British loan which was for the construction 
of shipyards capable of producing both large and small ships. The Indian 
government refused an offer from the British to provide obsolete British 
vessels but they accepted in 1965 a Soviet offer of modern frigates~ 
These frigates were later modernized with a British produced surface-to-
1 
air missle known as the "Sea Cat. 11 Other Soviet aid included the con-
struction of shipyards within India which were operated by Seviet 
8 
trained personnel. 
17 
India's naval expansiort, which included the naval airforce, empha-
sized cembatant-type ships and aircraft. Its major additions w:ere in 
submarines, frigates, torpedo bdats, es.cort destroyers and "Sea Hawk" 
fighter bombers. By 1971, India had increased its naval strength by 
twenty.six per cent ever1962 figures and poss~ssed the capability to 
construct all types of ship.s, including, escort and landing craft. Its 
first large frig.ate was cemplet.ed in 1971. (See Figures 3 and 4 of the 
Appendix). 
Prior to 1962 the Indian airforce censtituted the most effective 
striking force in the Indian Ocean. It consisted of abeut one thousand 
aircraft of all types acquired from Great Britain, France, Seviet Union, 
Canada and indigenous sources. The multiplicity of aircraft, however, 
created serious problems for India during the 1962 war. The lack of 
spare parts and poor maintenance management caused the grounding of a 
larger percentage .of aircraft during the conflict. The aircraft that 
were deployed were ineffective because ef the ineptitude of its pilots~ 9 
After the hostilities ef 1962 and 1965 with China and Pakistan re-
spectively, India increased the number of aircraft in its airferce. The 
additional aircraft were secured primarily from the Soviet ,Unien and 
Great Britain. The United States stopped its military aid p'rogram te 
India in L965 because of the Indian war with Pakistan. The Soviets pro-
vided the :Indians with one of their lat·est interceptors and fighter air-
craft, the Mig721 and SU-7. The British provided the Indians with a 
8Kavic, pp.;. 11~-123. 
9
,Ibid .,, pp .J>;· 113-1'15; 
_'l ' .• ~ 
'· 
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mod¢rn fighter bomber code..-named .· the "Hunter.'~ The Soviets also pro-
vided the Indians with the equipment.and.advisory personnel to build air-
craft manufacturing plants in India. Thes.e. plants, when completed, w.ere 
capable of assembling aircraft received from the Soviet Union and of pro-
ducing aircraft from raw material.. I.ndia' s combatant aircraft increased 
in. number during the period 1962 to 1971 over two hundred fifty per cent. 
This was an increase of six hundred aircraft. (See Figure 4 of the .Ap-
pendix). 
India's increased emphasis on defense created a serious lopsided 
position of power with Pakistan, which was manifested primarily in the 
increase of strategic offensive weapons for the airforce and navy. 
, ....... 
Indian combatant aircraft on the eve of the 1971 war consisted of 
approximately fifty per cent fighter ... bombers and fifty per cent inter-
ceptor type aircraft. Pakistan's airforce consisted of approximately 
eighty-five per cent int.erceptor aircraft. India, also possessed a nu-
merical superiority of approximately four to one in all types of com-
batant aircraft over Pakistan. 
The Indian emphasis on both offensive and defensive aircraft was 
influenced by its relationship with China. The size of the China main-
land prevented any reliance on Indian fighter bombers as a decisive 
determinant in the outcome of a second war with China. The short flight 
time of the Mig-21, India's primary interceptor, also prevented India 
from providing escort aircraft for its fighter bombers and seriously 
limited operations into the China mainland •. The combat radius of the 
Mig-21 is_ only two hundred fifty miles. Thus, the Indian airforce, in 
a war with China, would have to rely heavily on its defensive intercep-
tors to prevent the Chinese from gaining. and maintaining air superiority 
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over land contested by ground forces. On the other hand, India's 
fighter bombers, supported with interceptors, were within easy range of 
any target within east or west Pakis.tan. India's large airforce posed 
a serious offensive threat vi.s-a-vis Pakistan. 
A similar comparison can also be made of India's naval force. 
China I s Large naval force prevented any attempt by the Indians ta effect 
a naval blockade or compete with the Chinese at sea. However, India's 
increase in combatant ships and the close geographical location of Pak-
istan's harbors provided India with the capability to effect a naval 
blockade and defeat Pakistan at sea. Thus, while it is difficult to 
imagine a successful offensive operation against the Chinese without 
Soviet support, the Indian military forces possessed an unquestionable 
superior offensive and defensive capability vis-a-vis Pakistan in 1971. 
Under the new defense plan a new directorate was established which 
was titled the Directorate of Combat Development. Its mission was to in-
crease the supply of arms from within the country and to develop new 
weapons and corresponding tactical concepts for their employment. Under 
this directorate, defense production in India surged after 1965. Public 
and private manufacturers were mobilized to produce war material. A 
merger of three aircraft companies resulted in the establishment in 1964 
of· Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, which produced fighter aircraft. 
Three other aircraft factories were set up .. to manufacture aircraft from 
raw materials to include the production of support aircraft, helicop-
ters, and jet trainers. Bharat Electronics, which began production in 
1956 with three different types of equipment, produced over seventy 
different models and types of electronic equipment usable by the military 
in 1971. The capacity to produce military support equipment such as 
zo 
railway. coaches and earth-moving equipment also had been expanded or de-
10 
veloped·, by 1971.. Consequently, by 1971, India was considered a sec-
ondary arms producer by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 
England. (See Figures 5 and 6 for a listing of additional equipment 
produced or assembled within India). Also, defense expenditures between 
1967 and 1971 consumed over f9rty per cent of India's annual 'budget and 
·11 
doubled the expenditures of the Pakistan government. 
India's superior war potential was also reflected in other relevant 
elements of military strength. Its population far exceeded that of Pak-
istan. According to United Nation estimates, India's 1971 total popula-
tion was in excess of 547.4 million, with 283.5 million males. 12 Pakis-
tan's census of the same year listed a total population of 114.2 million, 
with male population figures unavailable. 13 The 1961 census for both 
India and Pakistan recorded India I s male population in the age group of 
twenty to forty to be.56.3 million compared to 15 million for Pakistan. 14 
Thus, in the age group from which mil.it.ary personnel and industrial 
workers are recruited, the Indians outnumbered the Pakistanis by more 
than forty-one million men in 1961. 
In the area of energy production, during the year 1970, India 
lOindian Yearbook, 1960-1971 (Faridabad, India, 1971, pp. 51-61, 
181-220. 
11rnstitute oLStrategic .S_tudies, The :t;iilitary Balance, 1965-1971. 
12oemographic Yearbook, 1971 (New York, 1972), p. 144. 
l3Ibid • , p. 1.46. 
140 h" Y b k 1970 (N Y k 1971) 275 290 emograp 1.c ear oo , ew or , , pp. , • 
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15 produced 88.4million metric tons (equivalent to tons of coal) . compared 
16· 
to 6.75 million metric tons in Pakistan. Pakistan had very little coal 
~ 
and no coke compared to India, which had l.ar.g.e reserves of coal and coke 
and produced 7,905,000 tons of ~teel in 1970. Pakistan produced only 
15,000 tons of steel during the same year. In petrole~m refining, India 
refined 23,290,000 metric tons compared with 5,080,000 metric tons re-
. 17 fined by Pakistan. -
Pakistan's low industrial production caused the country to depend 
heavily on foreign imports for aircraft, tanks, ships, fuel, lubricants, 
and other related material. 18 India, to the contrary, produced or assem-
bled various types of aircraft, ships, and tanks, thus maintaining a 
lesser degree of dependency on its allies than did Pakistan. India's war 
potential far exceeded that of Pakistan; India was unquestionably the 
superior military power in South Asia: 
This lop-sided position of power with Pakistan (see Figure 7 of the 
Appendix), caused the Indian leaders to seek a permanent settlement of 
their security problem with Pakistan. In a radio message just prior to 
the massive intervention by India, Prime Minist~r Indira Gandhi an-
nounced: "It is the united will of our,_ people that this wanton and un-
provoked aggression of Pakistan should be decisively and finally 
15statistical Yearbook, 1971 (New Yor~, 1972), p. 336. 
16Ibid., p. 336. 
17E · S f A d h 1969 (N Y k 1970) - conotinc urvey .2..... sia ~ t e Far East, ew or , , 
p. 237. 
18Area Handbook for Pakistan (Washington, D. c., 1971), p. 5.82. 
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repelled •11 One of India I s leading generals echoed: "This time we,, 
· 11 b . h h d . . 11 20 wi e given a c ance to reac a ec1s1on. 
19 New York Times, December 5, 1971, P• 1. 
20Ibid. 
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Cl:IAPTER III 
INDIA'S "COST-GAIN" ESTIMATES 
India's course of action in this conflict reflected a r~tional ap-
praisal of the various alternatives open for selection. Although David 
Bayley argues that India could have achieved the same results through 
peaceful measures, the strategy that the Indian leaders chose achieved 
the desired results. Other peaceful alternatives offered no guarantee 
of success. The gains_acquired through the use of force seemed to have 
outweighed any possible advantages that peaceful measures could have 
achieved. Through the use of its military power and skillful diplomatic 
initiatives, India achieved an unquestionable dominance in the subconti-, 
nent by using. its military power to establish Bangladesh as an indepen-
dent state, India generated a relationship between itself and the new 
natien that would challenge any pressure that the Pakistani government 
might exert in the future against Bangladesh. 
John Lovell advances the notion that the rationale of a nation's 
straFegy is for the leaders to plan "to adv~nce the inte.rests of their 
nation-state while preventing other nation-states from impinging on such 
. 1 
interests." This requires the decision-makers to rationally develop 
"cost-gain" estimates which provid~ the framework for maximizing their 
1 John Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective (New York, 1970), p. 
66. 
23 
24 
losses when they are determining which course of action to take .in a 
giv:en situation. This analysis alsoentails a clear calculation of the 
nation's basic determinants of its foreign policy. 
India's foreign and domestic policies have been influenced by its 
relationship with other countries, notably, Pakistan, China, and the two 
big powers. The partition of India in 1947 left many unresolved prob-
lems. Pakistan, viewing India after the Partition as its primary threat, 
entered into military alliances with other nations in order to create a 
favorable position of power vis-a-vis India. It also entered into agree-
ments with other nations to obtain military supplies for its forces. 
India reacted to this threat and diverted money and resources needed for 
nation-building to defense expenditures. It also entered into agreements 
with other nations to obtain military supplies. These agreements have 
had the effect of involving both countries in the cold war. In addition, 
India has fought three wars with Pakistan, which has strained its eco-
nomic development. It is therefore understartdable that J. Bandyopadhyaya 
would conclude the following: 
The existence of Pakistan as a hostile neighbor has profoundly 
affected, and was bound to affect, India's security, national 
development and relations with 0th.er states •••• It ought. to have 
been from the beginning, and ought., t.o be in the future, one of 
the major objectives of .our fo.re.ign. po.Licy to normali~e re-
lations .with Pakistan to the maximum possible extent. 
China has been viewed primarily as a threat to India's territorial 
integrity. A9 a result of the 1962 war, India has been faced with the 
problem of guarding the numerous passes over the Himalayan Mountains that 
provide direct access to India from Tibet. This boundary with China is 
2 J. Bandyopadhyaya, India's Foreign Policy (New Yor~, 1970), p. 98. 
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braken by the existence af three small states which pases additional 
security p.rablems far Ind.ia.* India, therefare, has had ta exercise 
cansiderable caution in its relations with.these states ta prevent them 
.. 
fram develaping R favarable a.rientatian taward China ta the detriment af 
,India's security. India's most impartant determinant in its relatianship 
with China in terms of s.ecurity i.s .the existence of this mounta:inous 
barrier between China and the .subcontinent. It is in India's vital 
interest to achieve more acceptable .relationships with Pakistan in order 
to maintain an effective defensive posture against China. 
India's relationship with the two big powers has been a praclaimed 
non-involvement in the cold war and the maintenance of a bargaining pa-
sition which would enable it to acquire military and ee;_onamic aid from 
both. To offset the political pressure that either of the two big 
pewers may exert through foreign aid, it w:as essential that IndiiS main"'\ 
tain multiple saurces of aid. The United- .. S.tates has been viewed, pri-
marily as a foreign aid contributor, while.the S0viet Union, because af 
its proximity to India, has been viewed as a foreign aid contributer and 
a major threat ta India's security~~ India, ther:e.f.are, has been re- '· 
quired to develap a saund relationship with both Moscaw and Washingtan 
ta enhance its bargaining position and maximize its security posture. 
As dependence an the two big powers declines, it will be able ta assert 
its daminance _in· the regian and will be able ta limit foreign interfer--
d "d . 4 ence an auts1. e security manag.ers. 
*See Chapter II. 
3Ibid., p. 61. 
For the present, however, it is in 
4 . 
Ashak Kapus, "Inda-Saviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance,!' 
Asian Survey (May, 1972), p. 471. 
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India's interest to maintain its dominance in South Asia to prevent the 
development of any challenging power in the region. 
These factors have provided the framework in which the Indian 
d.ecision-makers determined the course of action to take .during the 
crisis, "to advance the interests of their nation~state while preventing 
other nation-states from impinging on such interests.115 
The crisis of 1971 brought about an opportunity to achieve an ac-
ceptable relationship with Pakistan and maximize India's security posture 
in the region. India's preponderant military power heightened the pros-
pects of a quick decisive action which would bring about a separation of 
East. Pakistan from the larger state and in its place establish an autono-
mous state to its east, independent of its hostile neighbor in the west. 
This would have the advantage of reducing the possibility of a two front 
war and would reduce Pakistan I s national power to a permanent position 
of inferiority that would present no challenge to India in the future. 
In the 1970 Pakistani elections, the Awami League Party of East 
Pakistan obtained a clear majority in the constituent assembly. The 
leader of the party, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, who was to assume the position 
of Prime Minister, had proclaimed a six-point program to give East Pakis-
d f · h" h 6 tan a greater egree o autonomy wit 1n t e country. The election re-
sults and Mujibur 1 s platform promised an easing of tensions between the 
two nations. These hopes on the part of the Indian leaders were thwarted 
by the ar~est of Sheik Mujibur and the repressive measures instituted by 
5 Lovell, p. 61. 
6 Dunbar Davis, "Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations," 
Asian Survey (May, 1972), p. 446. 
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the Pakistani government against the people of East Pakistan. This came 
as a disappointment to Mrs. Gandhi. She had hoped to achieve better re-
lationships with Pakistan as a result of the elections. Speaking of the 
developments in Pakistan in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, Mrs. 
Gandhi said: 
This house expresses its deep anguish and grave concern at 
the recent developments in East Bengal •• _ •• Something new had 
happened in East Bengal. ••. a deII1,ocratic action where an en-
tire people has spoken with almost one voice. We have wel-
comed this, not. because we want:ed any interference in anoth~r 
country's affairs, but because there were the values ••• for 
which we have always spoken out. And we had hoped that this 
action would heLp us . to get. closer, which would help us to 
serve our own peopl.e .better .. and create an entirely new situa-
tion. A wonderful op.po.rtunit.y. for even the strengthening of 
Pakistan has been lost.7 
The arrival of millions of refugees from East Pakistan into West 
Bengal caused severe political and economic problems for the Indian 
union. India was forced to divert money and needed resources from its 
8 development efforts to care for the refugees. The problems of social 
and political instability in West Bengal were compounded by the influx 
of refugees and attempts by the newly elected state government to alter 
the violence remained ineffective. Consequently, the state was placed 
under President's Rule in June, 1971, by the central government in an 
attempt to bring about some measure of control to the area through a co-
ordinated effort between local and national. leaders. 
In order to understand the plight of the Indian national and state 
leaders of West Bengal during the year leading up to the 1971 war, it is 
essential to review the history of political development within West 
7Why Bangladesh? (Bangladesh, 1971), p. 36. 
8 Bayley, p. 92. 
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Bengal, particularly the history of the state's Communist party. 
Since the 1930' s the Communists o.f West Bengal had been able to sus-
tain a high level of violence and insurrectionist activity within the 
state. The West Bengal terrai~, which consisted of hills and mountains, 
jungles, swamps and marshes, was conducive to guerrilla type activity. 
Many of its people, who are landless peasants and poor urban dwellers, 
felt alienated from the state's government and were ~asily mobilized into 
revolutionary activity by the Communists. The Communists took advantage 
of the existing grievances of the pop.u.lation over land reform, economic. 
disparity between the rich and poor, unemployment and slum clearance. 
Other problems in West Bengal included tne low production in its industry 
and agriculture, which had steadily declined over the past fifty years 
and consequently caused a widening of the gap between the rich, and poor. 
Essentially a middle class party, the Communists drew their leader-
9 
ship and support from respected families of the state. These families 
were known as Bhadraloks, a privileged minority of West Bengal known for 
their education and pride in Bengal history, language and unity. Their 
group unity had previously forced a decision from the c~ntral government 
in 1905 to reunite the Bengali state after a previous partition in 1901. 
During the 1930 1 s, however, electoral politics brought about a decline_ 
of their dominance of the State's politics primarily because of their 
middle .class status and the wi~e gap which existed between the literate 
rich and the illiterate poor. Their social decline caused a large number 
of the Bhadraloks to enter the Communist party and to support guerrilla 
type activity-advocated by the Communists against the state government. 
9 Marcus F. Franda, Radical P.olitics in West Bengal (Cambridg.e, 
1971), P• 251. 
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By 1942, the Conununists had made ma.jor inroads into the student or-
ganizations, peasant organizations, and.trade and labor unions of the 
I 
areas in and around Calcutta. This base of support allowed them in 1946 
to achieve the status of major oppo.sition to the Congress party in the 
10 first legislative assembly in West BengaL., The CoIIl!Ilunist party was 
banned, however, in 1948 by the state government because of large in-
surrectionist activities conducted by t.he p.arty' s supporters after World 
War II. Although many of their leaders were jailed during the period 
1948 to 1951, they still continued their militant efforts to overthrow 
the government of West Bengal. In 1952, through a coalition formed with 
the Socialist Republican party Marxist left parties, headed by Sarat 
Bose, the Conununists were able to rally the support of urban intellec-
tuals and former terrorists and again become the major opposition to the 
C.ongress government. They took advantage of the existing situation of 
food shortages and inadequate relief suppl,i.es for refugees. After this 
election, however, serious factionalism developed within the movement, 
which eventually led to a split of the Conununist party in 1964. 11 
The party suffered a general decline after the split and lost a 
number of respected leaders. The decline of the party also caused the 
militant faction, which became known as the Communists Par,ty, Marxist 
12 (CPM) to become more embittered and radical. In December, 1964, the 
Indian government took forceful measures against this faction and ar-
rested over nine hundred of its membership. 
lOibid. ,, P• 35. 
11Ibid.' P· 85. 
12 . 
referred as CPM. Hereafter to 
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This period of political disturbances within West Bengal was paral-. 
leled by similar disturbances within the state of Kerela. President's 
Rule had been imposed on Kerela by the central government because of 
widespread violence caused by Communist-Led groups. The problems of food 
shortages, price increases, student and teacher grievances provided a 
fertile ground for insurrectionist ac~ivity. The imposing of President's 
Rule on the state and forceful police measures against the militant 
groups became a focal point of concern within West Bengal and caused a 
new wave of violent activity within the state. The West Bengal Legisla-
tive Assembly was unable to obtain a consensus on measures recommended 
by its members to handle the situation and stood in opposition to meas-
ures recommended by the central government. Finally, the army and police. 
took measures to suppress the violence without specific guidance from the 
central government or state legislature. 
During the period 1964 through 1967, the Congress Party maintained 
i~~ dominance of the West Bengal state government but it suffered a de-
cline in effectiveness. Party factionalism increased during this period, 
and eventually developed into a split of the party in 1966. The Com~ 
munists capitalized on this split within the Congress Party and on the 
failure of the Congress Party's socialist program and formed an alliance 
in 1967 and in 1969 wi,th other leftist parties, which brought about the 
United Front Coalition after these elections. The Communist Party domi-, 
nated the coalition and chose to enter the ministries in ·order to gain a 
greater support base for the party.· Th~se diss~nters within the Com-
munist Party who did not favor this political decision continued to sup-
port militant activities against the state government. They focused 
the~r efforts on the Naxalbari peasant agitation in the Darjeeling 
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district. 
The Darjeeling district encompass~ .. strategic. territory in the 
northe:r;n portion of West Bengal. It consisted of one hundred square 
miles of territory bordered by Nepal on the west and East Pakistan on the 
east and south. It is located in the vicinity of Sikkim. Tibetan 
China, and Bhutan at a point where India's narrowest corridor is thirteen 
to fourteen miles wide and connects the main portions of India with all 
five of its northeastern states and territories. This area has had a 
long history of peasant agitation and discontent over land disputes. The 
Naxalbari movement, consisting of the lower classes. led by an indigenous 
agrarian leadership, was typical of the revolts within West Bengal caused 
by overcrowded land and exploit.ation by money lenders and land specula-
tors. 
The peasants of· this area, knawn as Naxalites, had became peliti-
cally alienated from the state government .b.ecause of an Estates· Acqui-
sition Act enacted in 1954. This act attempted to correct some of the 
land inequities in West Bengal but excluded the land cultivated in tea 
faund in this area. The Communists took advantage of this alienation and 
became the leaders of wide-spread agitation in 1967. Two prominent 
agrarian leaders, Kanu Sany al and Kho tan Majumdar, both with long his-
tories of terrorist activities were active in this area. While these 
two leaders were originally affiliated with the CPM; since 1964, they 
had operated outside of the party. Praminent leaders within the Com-
munist Party including Pramode Das Gupta, Hare Krishna Kona and Fanesh 
Gosh had maintained continuous Liaison with the Naxalites in an attempt 
to gain and maintain their support. 
After the Communists had achieved political power and had entered 
32 
the ministries, they attempted to appease the Naxalites by enacting an 
eighteeen-point program in which they agreed to "recognize the rights of 
workers and peasants to voice their just demands and grievances," and 
also "not to suppress the democratic and legitimate struggles of the 
13 people." This appeal was expected to curtail the militant activities 
against the state government since the Connnunists were in power. The 
Naxalites however, ignored the appeal and launched a new terrorist cam-
paign in 1967, drawing wide-spread support from the peasants of West 
Bengal. They declared that the existing system of government was not 
meeting their just needs and its failure to do so was a sign of the de-
cadence and backwardness of the people in power. 14 There were over four 
thousand Connnunist supporters and sympathizers within the state govern-
ment who attempted to maintain contact with the Naxalites during this 
period. Action was finally taken against the Naxalites by the United 
Front Government, which resulted in the imprisonment of prominent Naxa-
lite leaders. 
This dissident faction within the Connnunist organization, working 
from a strong base in West Bengal and with an all Indian membership of 
over thirty thousand, formed a new party, the Connnunist Party of India, 
Marxist-Leninist (CPIML}. 15 The new party proclaimed that its primary 
objective was to 11 confront the state and central government with a real-
istic challenge for political power in West Bengal through revolutionary 
13Ibid., P• 160. 
14Ibid., P• 165. 
15Ibid., p. 167. 
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tactics •1116 Through wide-spread violence and militant activities, they 
managed to completely suspend all political activities within Durgapur, 
one of West Bengal's leading industrial cities. The United Front Govern-
ment was reluctant to take forceful actions against the new party in fear 
of alienating many of the part~'s supporters who were attracted to the 
program of the CPIML, especially students who were the primary instru-
ments of tJ:\e violent activity. In 1970 and 1971 the new party, with 
support from the Naxalites, inflicted an average of ten political slay-
ings and a number of lootings and robberies everyday within the city of 
17 Calcutta. 
As a result of this unstable political situation, many Bengalis, 
especially the youth, were attracted to these insurrectionist activities 
and looked to the Soviets and the Chinese for support. They held the 
existing system of government responsible for the decline of Bengal I s 
greatness and looked forward to some type of regional identity and re-
gional political power in conjun~tion with East Bengal. Franda ass'erts 
the following: 
Many Bengali leftists, both in India and in Pakistan, argued 
that the only solution to the problem lies in the creation of 
a united Bengal, brought about. by gue:rrilla warfa~e and sup-
ported by the Chinese. But neither the Indian nor Pakistani 
strategists who advocated that solution devised a means for 
initiating a guerrilla movement, and Chinese support was by no 
means assured. There were considerable factional differences 
among communists'and marxists and leftist strategists on the 
question .of linking a Maoist strategy with the demand for a 
united Bengal, since the two do not necessarily need to be 
linked together.18 
16Ibid., p. 176. 
17N· Y k'T" A. 5 1971 5 ~ :...2.L 1.mes, ugust · , · , p. • 
18 Franda, p. 259. 
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After the elections of 1967 and 1969, the United Front Coalition 
Government was replaced by President's· Rule because of widespread vio-
lence. Franda asserts that factional differences within the elected 
Cannnunist-dominated United Front Government of 1967 and 1969 were a major 
cause of the inability of the government to satisfactorily respond to the 
19 demands of the .various factions and subregions in West Bengal. 
In March, 1971, Mrs. Gandhi won a, sweeping victory for her New Con-
gress Party. Since 1966, she had been Prime Minister of India, but had 
not dominated the Congress Party. In 1969, she forced the resignation 
of the deputy Prime Minister, which resulted in the splitting of the Con-
gress Party, and she carried her faction to victory in 1971. In West 
Bengal her New Congress Party achieved a similar victory. 
The Indian National Congress had been able to constrain conflicts 
in India's pluralistic society and prevent the collapse of the parlia'"'! 
mentary system in India. It was generally opposed to militant and revo-
lutionary tactics. The party was able.to achieve a measure of stability 
in West Bengal until its electoral defeat in 1967. 
Mrs. Gandhi sought to extend her political power to the states, and 
through this, to achieve political stability .for the country. Ramashray 
Roy viewed the objectives af the New Congress government as follows: 
The basic objective of the New Congress Party was to build a 
unified articulated organization capable of not only success-· 
fully converting pofular support into electoral victo'ry, but 
also of transforming electoral victory in viable system per-
formance. 20 ' · 
Mrs. Gandhi was reelected in 1971 under a slogan of eliminating 
19Ibid.~ p. 251. 
. 
20Ramashray Roy, "India, 1972: Fissure in the Fortress," Asian 
s\irvey (February, 1972), p. 233. 
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poverty. This included.solving the problems of economic disparity be-
tween the rich and the po0r, unempleyment, rising prices, irrigation, 
21 family planning, slum clearance,. and other similar pr0grams. She had 
ta ask for a delay in me.eting. these problems w.hi le. diverting funds to the 
22 
refugee preblem, thus putting. her ehct0ral victery in jeepardy. · The 
cost ef supporting the refugees had co.st well over $100 million by No-
vember, 1971. 
Mrs. Gandhi I s victory at the polls came fifteen days before the 
massive influx of refugees· into West Bengals. The refugees compounded 
the problems of domestic vielence, unemployment, and rising prices within 
West Bengal. In view. of the fact that .India ,has had a leng standing se-.. 
curity problem with Pakistan since partition and has had to divert vital 
developmental resources to its military build-up, it is understandable 
that its leaders should view the situation in East Pakistan as latent 
with opportunities. A partition of Pakis.tan protnised an opportunity te 
return the .refug.ees to East Pakistan and allow the New Congress Party a 
chance ta improve conditions causing political instability in West Ben-
gal. 
The Secretary General ef the Uni~,d Nations att-empted to persuade 
India and Pakistan to accept United Nations' civilian observers on their 
territories and assist in bringing about a solution. to the refugee prob-. 
lem. The proposal was accepted by Pakistan, but was rejected by India. 
India argued that this measure would divert attention from the basic 
causes of the conflict and would not bring about a politically stable 
21 ~ York Times, March 19, 1971, p. 1. 
22Ibid .. ,. March 12, 1971, p. 1. 
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situation in the region. 23 Unilateral attempts by Iran, Britain, and the 
United States to persuade India to accep.t the civilian observers also 
. 24 failed. Mrs. Gandhi stated that she would accept interference from the 
United Nations if the following conditions were met: 
•• ,.(I would) welcome any action by the United Nation which 
would insure and guarantee, under adequate international 
supervision, that the refugees' lands, houses, and property 
will be returned to them in East Pakistan, and that condi-
tions are created there to insure their safe return und~r 
credible international. guarantees without threat of re-
prisal or other measures of re~ression from the military 
authorities in West Pakistan.2 
If these conditions were to be met by the Pakistani government, it 
would have entailed a complete reversal of its policies in East Pakistan. 
It would have required the Pakistani government to recognize the autonomy 
of East Pakistan sought by Sheik Majubur and his followers, a withdrawal 
of West Pakistani troops from East Pakistan, the release of Sheik Mujibur 
and his subsequent appointment to the Prime Ministership, and the seating 
of the constituent assembly as elected. These conditions constituted the 
principal cause of the conflict. 
The rejection of outside observers by India allowed the military and 
the inhabitants of West Bengal to provide continuous support to the East 
Pakistan insurgents. This support could have been internationally em-
barrassing for India if discovered by impartial United Nations' obser'-
vers. Under these circumstances, the Indian military leadership was 
able.to develop favorable tactical advantages needed f9r a possible con-
ventional confrontation with East Pakistani forces. Moreover, by keeping 
23Ibid., August 3, 1971, P• 3. 
24Ibid., October 14, 1971, p. 1. 
25Ibid.,. August 3, 1971, P• 3. 
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the refugee is.sue .alive within the United Nations, India was able to 
bring to the .attention of all nations its "bene.v.a.Lent" respa.nsa .and .. 
thereby create a· favorable platform and sympathy for its anticipated 
military actions. 
The military situation along the border between India and Pakistan 
grew more tense during the summer of 1971. India reacted to the military 
developments by entering into a treaty with the.Soviet Union in August 
of 1971. Article IX of the treaty was the most significant in terms ef 
military assistance. It provided for the following: 
·Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from 
providing any assistance to any third country that en-
gages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the· 
event of either Party being suqjected to an attack or a 
threat thereof, the High .. C.antracting Parties shall im-
mediately enter into mutual consultations in order to. 
remove such threat and t.o take appropriate effective 
measures to ensure peace and the'security of their coun-
tries.26 
Even though the Soviet Union had provided military assistance to 
the Indian government since 1964, this treaty legitimized future military 
aid, especially needed in the event of a large scale ~onventional con ... , 
frontation with Pakistani military forces. The treaty also provided 
India with the psychological motivation to use force if necessary in 
spite of a possible alliance formed by Pakistan, China, and the United 
States. As stated by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko: "This treaty 
27 
should act as a deterrent to any power that might attack India."· · 
In order to achieve more acceptable relations with Pakistan and to 
bring about a measure of stability in West Bengal, Indian leaders 
26 WGCDR M. K. Chopra, "Inda-Soviet Treaty," Military Review (Decem-
ber, 1971), p. 24-
27New York Times, October 23, 1971, p, 2. 
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developed a strategy to prevent other international powers from impinging 
on its national interests and dev.eloped a sense of confidence in the 
Indian Union to take whatever course of action that might be warranted. 
In develeping lter. strategy, Mrs .• Gandhi ignored attempts by outside 
powers to bring about a solution to the crisis. In addition to ignoring 
recommendations for utilizing United Nations' observers from other na-
tions, India also refused to recognize the .General Assembly's call for a 
f . 28 d · d 1 · b db h S U . cease ire an ignore a reso ution su mitte y t e oviet nion to 
the General Assembly which called for a cease fire but not a withdrawal 
29 
of troops. 
In deciding which course of action to take, David Bayley ?ad ad-
vanced the argument that other significant factors were probably under 
consideration by the Indian leaders. He implied that the cost of con-
tinued support for the refugees would have had a more devastating effect 
on the Indian economy if the situation had remained static. Politically, 
he asserts that not only were the refugees contributing to the existing 
political instability in West Bengal, but also in East Pakistan, a i>ro-
longed insurgency may have passed the leadership of the Awami League to 
more hostile and radical elements. He also asserted that if the crisis 
had continued, not only would Pakistan have been able to become mili-, 
tarily stronger, but also that greater international pressure may have 
been applied to bring about a settlement to the detriment of an indepen-
30 dent Bangladesh. 
28Ibid., December 9, 1971, P• 1. 
29Ibid. ,. December 8, 1971, P• 19. 
30 96. Bayley, P• 
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India's preponderant military power, sup.ported by the Soviet Union, 
lent motivation to the Indian leaders to use force if necessary. India 
was willing to risk the costs of a military action against Pakistan given 
the threat of a. c.ontinued strain .on its economy and heightened political 
instability in West Bengal. 
India expected to emerge from the war with significant gains, and 
did so. Immediately after the,war, the West Bengal government undertook 
forceful measures against· the Naxalites. Mazumbar and Sanyal, along with 
scores of district and lower level Naxalite leaders, ~ere captured and 
imprisoned. The atrocities within the state subsided ~nd many desertions 
occurred within the Naxalite ranks. 31 Kasturi Rangan, the author of an 
article appearing in The New York Times, attributes this to the establish-
ment of Bangladesh and the strength of Indira Gandhi's Congress Party in 
West Bengal. He asserts that the., supply line from East Pakistan to the 
Naxalites from which they obtained their arms and supplies were cut off 
by the state administration. He alsa asserts that the new administra-
. 
tion also was able,to encourage wide-spread defections from the Naxalites 
32 
and consequently to deny support for the new p.arty in West Bengal. Roy 
also cannnented on the conditions following the war in a similar manner. 
He stated: 
•• ,.the birth of Bangladesh •••. the consolidation of the, daminance 
of the New Congress Party under the adroit leadership of Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi ••• point to the fact that Indian policy has taken 
long st[ides towards stability and progress ••• the same factors 
31New York Times, August 5, 1972, p. 10. 
32Ibid. 
have c0ntributed immensely t0 the p,aople 1 s feelings of 
buoyancy, confidence,. p.iide, and faith in political 
leadership and political system.33 
40 
After the return of the refugee.s t.0 East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, 
all Indian tro0ps were returned to their homeland. This retreat allowed 
India to demonstrate Bangladesh I s i.ndep.endence and allowed other nations 
to extend foreign aid, reducing the ec:onomi9 dependence on India's re-
' 
sources. 
The United States began shipments of economic aid to Bangladesh on 
March 2, 1972.34 This aid was described by officials of the United 
States Agency for International Development as "the most generous and 
35 flexible ever offered by the United States to any country.'' This aid 
enabled the United States to become the major c0ntribut0r to the re-
36 habilitation of Bangladesh. The Soviets entered into trade agreements 
I 
37 
with Bangladesh early in January, 1972. By April some forty ts: fifty 
non-governmental organizations throughout the world were contributing 
assistance of all kinds. They ranged from the Red Cross to a Swedish 
38 group called Uncle Erik's Children Help. 
In addition to providing a comm0n focus for the Indian Union, which 
had an obvious unifying effect on the nation, the results were pol:i.ti-
cally useful for Mrs. Gandhi I s party. By adding this military and 
33 Roy, p. 231. 
34New York Times, March 3, 1972, P• 1. 
35Ibid., March 20, 1972, P• 1. 
36Ibid. 
37 . Ibid., January 10, 1972, p. 1. 
38Ibid., April 24, 1972, P• 1. 
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pqlitical victory to her election platform in 1972, she obtained a land-
slide political victory for her party in the state assembly elections of 
March, 1972. This election established the New Congress Party's domi-
39 
nance in the states. 
The treaty signed with the Soviet Union and the Soviet military as-, 
sistance provided during the crisis promised future economic and military 
assistance needed by India for nation-building. The Soviets have stra-
tegic interests in the region and have achieved international gains by 
opposing China and the United States in a remarkable diplomatic defeat. 
A Soviet official at the United Nations remarked: "This is the first 
40 
time that the United States and China have been defeated together.II 
Although the Soviet gains were high because of the prospects of extended 
influence in the region, India also gained by obtaining the support of a 
major power in developing its position of power vis-a-vis China. 
The major gain by India was the establishment of an unquestionable 
dominance in South Asia. John Kenneth Galbraith, a former ambassador to 
India, sunnriarizes this dominance as follows: 
When colonialism came to an end on the North American conti-
nent it left one large country, the United States, and a 
surrounding coterie of small ones. This proved to a re-
markably stable solution. There has been peace on this 
continent not because American, Canadians, Mexicans or Cubans, 
are morally superior t.o or otherwise more pacific than French-
men, Germans, Russians, or RngLishmen, but because there was 
never any question of a balance of military power •••.• 
When the British departed the Indian subcontinent, the 
expectation should have been of the North American solu-
tion •••• ,Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Nepal were smaller and 
weaker than India; they would learn to live with their 
large neighbor. And India would develop the attitudes 
39Ibid., March 12, 1972, p. 1. 
40 Ibid., December 20, 1972, p. 14. 
that become a big country in relation to small stat·es on 
its borders. This dev,alopment was delayed, alas by the 
dream that Paki.s.tan might be a military co~pt;1titor of 
India ••••. The Paki.stani dream,,. in turn, had ·a predictabl~ 
reaction in India •••• 
Now after twenty-five years the subcontinent enters, 
one .hopes, a new age in which something resembling the · 
Narth American equili.brium w:i.Ll obtain. The new Pakistan, 
like Canada on this continent, will be ecanomically ener-
getic and viable. Like.....C.anada in relation to the United 
States it will hardly be. a military competitor of India 
••.•• And with the threat of military competition from 
Pakistan removed., one hopes. that the military burden on 
the Indian people will be diminished. And one trusts 
that the habits which befit a powerful country in relation 
to smaller and weaker neighbors will develop in India. 
This, I venture to suppose, is already under way. It is 
hard to imagine that any serious Indian politician would 
now wish to base his political career on antipathy to 
Pakistan.41 
41India ~, August 18, 1972, P• 1. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MOTIVATION FOR WAR 
During October and Nov~ber of 1971 public statements issued by Mrs. 
Gandhi exhibited a will to use military force to bring about a return of 
the refugees to East Pakistan and establish the exiled East Pakistan 
government in power. Mrs. Gandhi I s use of force ~volved from her initia-
tives, both nat:ional and international, and those of her military leaders. 
who, since March, 1971, had S@rved to orient the nation to a war situa-
tion. 
During this period the position maintained by Mrs. Gandhi, mani-
fested through public speeches, was that the leaders of the Pakistan 
government must find a solution to the political instability in East 
Pakistan through negotiations with the imprisoned elected official of 
that portion of the .state before she would consider peace. talks between 
India and Pakistan. 1 The elected official to whom she was referring was 
Sheik Mujibur, who had been charged with inciting an insurrection in East 
Pakistan and who had consequently been impris.oned in West Pakistan. 2 She 
also insisted that the massive Indian troop concentrations along both 
borders with Pakistan would not be withdrawn and that she would not 
~ew York Times, October 19, 1971, p. 1 • 
......---..;...;.~.;;.. 
2Ibid., November 5, 1971, p. 1. 
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3 
accept. United Nations I observers on Indian soil. 
44 
During this period Indian government officials were demanding a more 
forceful response from the Indian military to Pakistani military attacks 
. 4 
on the East Pakistani guerrillas along the Indian eastern border. Also, 
Indian military leaders during this period were calculating the military 
strength required to achieve various possible military objectives in East 
Pakistan, and they were supporting the East Pakistani guerrillas in order 
to bring about favorable tactical advantages in case of a conventional 
war with Pakistan's military forces. These developments suggested a high 
priority for an alternative course of action that involved military force 
if the Pakistani government did not alter its policies in East Pakistan. 
By November, 1971, the strategy of the Indian political and military 
leaders had successfully converted the nation's military potential into 
an offensive military force supp0rted by the people of the country. 
Through carefully orchestrated speeches and actions, Indian politi-
cal leaders had "demonstrated" that vital Indian interests were at stake 
and a benevolent India was being forced into a war it did not want. The 
Indian leaders began cultivating within the Indian public the need to 
redress the situation in.March, 1971, by favorably responding to the 
hordes of destitute Ea,st Pakistani refugees, while, at the same time em-
phasizing the economic burden created by the refugees on the Indian 
economy. The Indian· leaders successfully directed their citizens to fo.rm 
an image of the Indian nation's predicament which was highly conduciv, 
to the use of force in resolving the conflict with Pakistan. In an 
3Ibid. 
4 . 
Ibid., October 20, 1971, p. 8. 
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address to the nation at the height of the confli.ct, Mrs .• Gandhi skill-
fully reiterated the strategy which broug.J:J,t about this common will to 
fight: 
Since last March we have borne the heaviest burdens and with-, 
stood the greatest of pressure and a tremendous effort to 
urge the world to help in bringi.11.g about a peaceful solution 
in preventing annihilation of an entire people whose only 
crime was to vote demo.cratical ly. But the world ignored the 
basic causes and concerned itself only with certain repe.r.-, 
cussions. I have no doubt that it is the united will of our 
people that this wanton and unprovoked aggression of Pakis-
tan should be decisively and finally repelled. In this re-
solve, the government is assured of the full and unflinching 
support of all political parties and every Indian citizen. 5 
The tension between India and Pakistan received international recog-
nition during the last days of March, 1971. The Pakistani army moved in-
to East Pakistan and began to use force to stop demonstrations and in-
surrectionist activities directed against the Pakistani government. The 
force used by the Pakistani military was legitimized by the announcement 
of new martial law regulations. Within a few days, the Indian press was 
printing articles which reflected how the situation in East Pakistan was 
perceived by the Indian government leaders. India's initial public at-
tention was directed toward the suffering of the oppressed people in 
East Pakistan and the refugees who fled into West Bengal. The Prime 
Minister described the Pakistani military action on March 27, 1971, as a 
people 
. 6 
The Indian Minister of movement "meeting unarmed with tanks." 
External Affairs reportedly made the following statement: 
5Ibid., December 4, 1971, p. 10. 
6 , 
Ibid., March 28, 1971, p. 3. 
We are prepared to make our contribution once again, in 
concert with the. members of the inte1;nat·ional connnunity 
or inte:rnatianal humanitarian arganizations, ·concerned 
with bringing r.elief to innacent victims af conflict, 7 
46 
In Calcutta, the newspapers were repa.rting incidents of butchery, 
massacres, rapes, and looting by Wes.t Pakistani soldiers. These reports 
caused demonstrations in West .Bengal. in support of the inhabitants of 
East Pakistan. ·-: Many students: went to East Pakistan to assist the East 
Pakistanis. A general strike by labor unions and leftist political 
• leaders was called in support of the people of East Pakistan. According 
to a correspondent for The: ~ York_ Times, the atrocities inflicted on 
the East Pakistani inhabitants by West Pakistani soldiers and the support 
rendered by the people of West Bengal to the refugees and inhabitants of 
East Pakistan repressed the historicai hatred between the Hindus of West 
Bengal and Moslems af East Pakistan. The correspondent reported the 
follawing: 
The West Pakistanis were appealing to the East Pakistanis to 
remember the common element of their religion in an effort 
to keep the nat.ion from pulling a~art; but the inhabitants 
of East Pakistan were saying., .. 'Hi.ndu, Moslem, that does not 
caunt anyi:p.ore. We are al 1 Bengalis; the enemy is now 
Punjabi. 1 8 
Internationally, The London Times called the crisis "senseless mur ... 
der, hysterical cruelty, and what must be a creeping fear run like a 
9 
current throughout this packed mass of human beings • ." Similar articles 
which centered on the atrocities to unarmed civilians and the refugee 
problem in India appeared in Chilean, Swiss, Austrian, Japanese, Turkish, 
7 WhyBangladesh?, P• 36. 
8 ~ York Times, April 11, 1971 1 p. 3. 
9 quoted in Why Bangladesh?, p. 27. 
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. and other countries 1 :new_spapers. The international relief organization 
of the Roman Catholic Church app,ealed. to the United Nations to bring 
about a solutian to the crisis in support of the oppressed people of East 
Pak~stan. 10 In the United States, even though United States leadership 
remained silent in the initial days of the-conflict, similar editorials 
appeared in The.New York Times, The Christian Science Mohitor, The 
Chicago. Tribune, and The Washington ~· The United States Agency for 
Internat.ianal Development supplied .. r.ice, bul~iir wheat, and vegetable oil 
to the refugees. This aid grew to one-third of the total. world contri-
bution by January, 1972. 11 
On April 10, 1971, the Indian government established a national 
c~IIDilittee called the Bangladesh Assistance CoIIDilittee, which was given 
the mission to. appeal to private sources far money, medicine, food, and 
clathing for t~e refugees. Refugee as.sistance had already cost the. 
Indian government over $550 million. India met the crisis by cutting 
1971 governmental expenditures by five per. cent, enacting variaus emer-
gency excise levies, establishing an incame surtax on all companies, and 
increasing some import duties. Assistance fram abroad had came to Rs~ 
137 .2 crares ($167 millicm) by mid-Novemb.e.r, 1971. The United States' 
share af the total pledge was $70 million. 12 
Mrs. Gandhi took advantage af the sympathetic and humane respanse 
fram the internatianal coJIDllunity ta request the foreign gavernments ta 
bring pressure on the Pakistani government and hasten a solution to the 
lONew· York Times, September 23, 1971, p. 11. 
11 Bayley, p .. 92. 
12Ibid. 
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crisis which would guarantee the rights of the East Pakistan inhabitants. 
She declared o.n June 15, 1971, that "India would never acquiesce in a 
political settlement at the cost of democracy and the rights of people 
fighting there•" 13 Perhaps this statement does not reflect a willingness 
to use military force at this time, but it does exhibit a determination 
to prevent the Pakistani government from est.ablishing a government over 
its eastern wing which did not include the popularly el~cted officials 
of that portion of the state. 
During this same period Mrs. Gandhi was also making statements in-
dicating that the political, economic and social pressures created by 
the refugees in West Bengal were detrimental to Indian unity. She in-
sisted that the relief for the refugees was only a palliati.ve and that 
14 the root cause of the conflict had to be tackled. As early as April, 
1971, most of the leading newspapers of India had advocated that the 
only alternative t~ the crisis was military intervention with the purpose 
of es·tablishing the elected government of East Pakistan in power. 15 
Also during this period the Indian military was assisting the guer-
rillas in East Pakistan with training and logistical support. There were 
also sympathy parades in Calcutta for the liberation forces and Indian 
guerrilla.warfare personnel crossed the border with homemade grenades, 
16 bombs, and other weapons to aid the guerrillas of East Pakistan. Ad-
ditionally, there were reports that India's military was supporting the 
13New York Times, ·June 16, 1971, p. 12. 
14Ibid., June 19, 1971, p,. 3. 
15M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Strategies, and 
Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement," Asian Survey (March, 1972), P• 198. 
16New York Times, March 31, 1971; ·p. 3. · 
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rebels with.mines, annnunitian, a-qd freshly trained Bengali reinfarce-
17 
ments. 
This elementary type af guerrilla tactics grew and emerged into 
more sophisticated activity. Later, the tactics used required the,· 
guerrillas to make a push into Pakistan to engage Pakistani troaps then 
· withdraw across the border. When the Pakis.tani troops crossed the bor-
der in, pursuit, the Indian conventional traops would apen fire and 
drive them back into Pakistan. By doing this, territory was seized in 
. 18 East Pakistan and guerrilla enclaves were estabh.shed. By November 
21, 1971, the guerrillas were baldly operating as far inland as Dacca 
and Indian assistance had increased ta the point that President Yahya 
Khan of Pakistan- warned that if the guerrillas seized a large part af 
East Pakistan, he would consider that an act of war by India and wou~d 
d 1 I d . 19 ec are war an n 1a •. 
India signed a treaty af peace, friendship, and caoperation with 
the Soviet Unian on August 12, 1971. This treaty had been under dis-
cussion far two years with the Indian leadership displaying reluctance 
to sign the treaty. When asked why the treaty was signed at this time, 
the Indian Defense Minister replied: !!Sire, the world is representing 
a rapidly changing and dynamic picture. There is a change in the con-, 
· 20 figuration of various world farces." This particular statement could 
been directed to many things, but the most obvious was the rapidly 
17IQid., August:· 8, 1971, P• 2 • 
.... 18 
Ibid., Navember 21, 1971, pp. 1, 5. 
l\bid., P• 5. 
20-wccDR M. K. Chopra, "Indo-Saviet Treaty,". Military Review (De-
' cember, 1971), p. 26. 
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changing border conflict between India and Pakistan. and the possibility 
of collusion on the part of Pakistan, the United States, and China 
against India. 
The signing of the t.reaty was immedi.ately followed by a personal 
21 
visit to tndia of the Soviet Foreign .. Mini.ster, Gromyko, and visits of 
1 h . h 1 1 S . · 1 · ff · · 1 22 S · h' S . U · severa ig eve oviet mi .1.tary o .1c1a s. ' ince t e oviet. nion 
was India's largest military supplier .and had contributed heavily during 
the past few years, it was no surprise that Indian officials admitted 
that "India's defense requirements would probably.be discussed during 
23 
the talks."· Western sources reported after the war that aircraft 
lost in the war were resupplied on a one-for-one basis. 24 Whether or 
not there was actual military assistance during the war 1 is unimportant •. 
The fact is that India, in a forceful strategic move, used the Soviet 
Unien to balance a p~ssible collusion on the part of the United States, 
China, Pakistan. As stated by Foreign Minister Gromyko: "This should 
act as a deterrent to any powers that might attack India.1125 India's 
preponderant military strength could defeat Pakistan I s military forces 
if there was no outside interference. 
Early in November there wer~ reports of considerable military aid 
from the Soviet Union. 26 After. th~ war officials in Moscow believed 
2
~ew.~ Times, August 13, 1971, p. 1. 
22Ibid., p. 9. 
23Ibid., P• 4. 
24Ibid •• March 31, 1972, p. 10. 
25Ibid •• October 23, 1971, p. 2. 
26Ibid., November 9, 1971, p. L 
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27 
that Soviet aid was ·the deciding factor in the war, There is no doubt 
that the Indians did regard .. their rel.at.ionship with the Soviets as a 
shield from the United States. When told of the news of a possible 
United States nuclear powered aircraft carrier patrolling in the Indian 
Ocean, an Indian official spokesman rep.lied: "It must be part of some 
28 psychological pressure." A correspondent for The -New York Times re-
ported that the Indian leaders regarded the carrier as a "crude and un-
acceptable pressure by the United States.1129 
In response to reports. that the Chinese were making advances in two 
places along the border between India and China, the Foreign Minister re-
plied that the Indian Government was aware of certain moves by the 
Ch . 30 1.nese. Whether this was regarded as a formidable threat or not, the 
movement of Chinese military forces had little or no effect on the 
operations of the Indian military. 
Late in October, India mobilized its state militia and military re-
serves and levied new taxes. While India was making these military 
preparations, Mrs. Gandhi was traveling about the world reasserting her 
country's economic needs and the social and political pressures caused 
by the refugees on her country. In her visits she also requested co-
operation from the foreign governments in bringing about a solution to 
31 
the hostilities in favor of the East Pakistani inhabitants. While she 
27Ib"d 1. • ,. P• 1. 
28Ibid ., December 20, 1971, P• 1. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid., December 16, 1971, P• 1. 
31 6, 1971, 10. Ibid., November P• 
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was away her military forces were deployed on both borders with Pakistan 
and major conventional conf.r.ontations were. occurring. Mrs. Gandhi re-
turned td India and asked a hawkish Parliament t.o. supp.o.rt .a solution . 
short of war. Howeyer; o.n November 24, her troops spearheaded a major 
attack across the Pakistani eastern border, which brought the two coun-
. . fl" 32 tries into open con ict. 
The Indian political and military leaders knew .full' well that India 
could achieve a decisive victory in a conventional war with Pakistan. 
Indian military leaders had sufficient time to plan their military strat- -
egy and to calculate the forces to be used in order to achieve decisive 
tactical and strategic results before Pakistani officials in West Pakis-
tan could mobilize their country's full war .potential. 
On the eve of the war, India's military strength was far superior to 
that of Pakistan, especially on the border o.f East Pakistan, where Pakis-
tan's troops numbered only 80,000 men. These troops not only faced 
India's conventional forces, but confronted the guerrillas of East Pakis-
tan and a hostile population. By late November, 1971, the insurgents 
constituted a formidable opposition to the :Pakistani troops. They were 
demonstrating the capability of launching full-scale conventional attacks 
and inflicting severe losses on Pakistan's conventiona'l forces. In re-
ports by the Indian government, it was stated that the guerrillas had 
knocked out several Pakistani tanks and pushed Pakistani, forces back for 
the first time on November 22. The insurgents I objectives were to. take 
d f k . 33 major strongholds centered in and aroun major cities o East Pa istan. 
32Ibid., November 24, 1971, p. 1. 
33Ibid., November 22, 1971, ·p. 11. 
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By November 25, the fighting was so fierce that Pakistani leaders were 
claiming intervention by In_dia I s conventional forces. Foreign military 
observers believed that this was not the case. They believed that pene-
. 34 
trations would have been deeper if the Indian army had been involved. 
However, it was later admitted that Indian trqops had made minor incur~ 
. 35 
sions across the border. 
By November 25, .Indian officials were so optimistic, they were will-
ing to apply military force to achieve their objectives in East Pakistan. 
One Indian official perceived the coordinated threat from the insurgents 
and the Indian military forces over the eight. month period as having left 
Pakistan's military leaders with only a bitter choice between a politi-
cally humiliating or militarily devastating path to partition of their 
36 
country. The Indian government had already prepared the groundwork 
necessary for a formal declaration of war. Their forward planning was 
to take major cities by a quick, decisive and highly mobile military 
tactic. Western diplomats in India were echoing, "The United Nations 
may be able to stop the fighting in the West ••• but no one on this side 
is going to stop and listen to the 'united Nations' Bray. They're going 
h . h . 1137 to pus rig tin. On the same day, Mrs. Gandhi was conditioning the 
masses for an eventual war with Pakistan. At a political rally in Cal-
cutta before the cri.sis broke, she spoke to a crowd of over 500,000 com-
menting: "We do not want to. fight. I hope they will not follow up their 
34Ibid., November 25, 1971, P• 8. 
35 . Ibid., November 24, 1971, P• 1. 
36Ibid., November 26, 1971, p. 1. 
37 . 
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talk; but if they do, we are prepared.1138 That same night after a 
Pakistani air attack, she broadcasted that Pakistan had launched a full-
scale war, and she took the opportunity to deciare a state of national 
emergency, le{:lving her country, as she staJ:,ed, with "no other option but 
to go on a war footing. 1139 In an address to Parliament the following 
morning, she stated that she commanded the full support of her party and 
the opposition parties and appealed to Parliament to unite and support 
the fight to safeguard the territorial integrity and national honor of 
India. Above all, she stated, "we are fighting for the cause of human 
40 freedom.". In a public statement that evening, she made similar appeals 
to the Indian public: 
The business community has a special responsibility to resist 
the temptation to hoard or to charge higher profit. Artists 
and writers, teachers and students, the nation looks to you 
to defend our ideals, to keep high our morale. To the women 
of our country, I make a special appeal to save every possible 
grain and rupes, to avoid waste. The sacrifice of each of us 
will build the nation's strength and enduring power ••• it is 
your responsibility to be prepared for a long struggle •••• the 
courage and fighting capability of the soldiers have to be 
backed by the dedicatio~ of the farmer, the worker, the tech-
nician, and the trader •. l 
Through this message, Mrs. Gandhi was conditioning the masses for a 
long sustained war, if necessary. The war, however, did not require a 
sustained effort. The decisive actions taken by the Indian military re-
fleeted the aggressive spirit to achieve a decision on the battlefield 
before Pakistan had a chance to mobilize. its war potential. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid. 
40 . Ibid., December 5, 1971, p. 1. 
41Ibid. 
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An important factor which enabled the Indians to act decisively was 
the role which Mrs. Gandhi played during. the conflict. She personally 
set the goals and made all major deci~ions. She held daily meetings with 
her top civilian and military officials and mapped out her tactics 
. 42 daily. This gave her leaders the direction and confidence needed for 
forceful implementation. The battlefield military decisions were left 
h 1 43 tote genera s •. 
On the same day of Mrs. Gandhi's message to the public, India's 
44 
airforce launched retaliatory strikes in East Pakistan. These raids 
were reported to have been made hourly. On the ground, Ind_ia's tanks 
spearheaded attacks from four major directions against East Pakistan. 45 
India obtained air and sea superiority in the initial days of fighting 
which prevented Pakistan from resupplying its forces in the east. The 
entire military effert was decisive and. f.orceful. When asked if he was 
pleased with how the operation was g.oing., .. the commanding officer of the 
eastern forces replied: 
A soldier is always pleased t.o ,get a. chance to exercise his 
professional skill •••• My mission is ta force the surrender 
of the Pakistani. t.roeps in East Pakistan as quickly as pos-
sible •••• My aim is hot t.o t.ake- a partic'.ular town but to get 
the surrender of the Pakistani forces ••• the only limitation 
the government has pl.aced on the offensive is not to cause 
unnecessary damage .to the infrastructure of Bangladesh, · 
which I think is quite right.46 
Indian efficials were at the same time stating their objectives. 
42Ibid., December 14, 1971, P• 1. 
43Ibid. 
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45Ibid. 
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They stated in public and in private that they would not honor a cease-
fire call by the United Nations until they had taken East Pakistan. They 
also stated that they had no designs on West Pakistan. They quickly 
passed a Defense of India bill in: the Indian Parliament and repeatedly 
applauded Mrs •. Gandhi when she gave accounts of success on the battle-
field. According to a correspondent for The New~ Times, the minority 
parties in Parliament are in normal times against government moves for 
emergency powers; however, the only thing the minority parties asked for 
~ 
this time was a promise that the power would be retained only as long as 
47 
necessary. This reflected strong support for Mrs.1Gandhi's policies 
within the Parliament and an. identity with,the military objectives of 
the government. 
On the third day of conventional fighting, India inflicted damages 
to fifty-two airplanes and eighty-nine tanks in East Pakistan. Some 
' P~kistani troops were reported to be in retreat to West Pakistan because 
of heavy losses. India also claimed to have achieved complete air su-
periority by virtually eliminating the. Pakistani airforce and sinking 
48 
two of five Pakistani ships. 
Mrs. Gandhi was repeatedly applauded when she announced diplomatic 
recognition of the rebel government in East Pakistan. According to a 
New Yo·rk Times correspondent, .this was v.iewed by Indians as a symbolic 
step toward the goal of establishing. a friendly government in Dacca and 
1 • 49 the end of a united and therefore dangerous Pakistan. 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid., December 6, 1971, P• 1. 
49Ibid., December 8, 197)., p. 1. 
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By December {>, the Indi-an leadership. was fully committed to a sepa-
rate state of Bangladesh. When the United States attempted to introduce 
a cease-fire resolution in the United Nations, a great .anger arose in 
India. The Indians felt that this action supported the old United States 
d f . I d . . . . h P k . 50 stan o equating_ n ia wit a istan. They argued that Pakistan was 
to blame for repressing the autonomy movement in East Pakistan. Editor-
ials in India forcefully warned that the feeiings of Indians would only 
be made stronger if :the United States cut off aid. One editor commented, 
51 
"Washington can shove its aid where it wants to.11 
White House officials in the United States realized by early Decem-
her that India was seeking to dismember Pakistan. United States' offic-
ials who declined to be quoted directly or identified reportedly asserted 
the following: 
The United States had wrung general concessions from the Pak-
istani government and had conveyed this information to New 
Delhi before the outbreak of hostilities •••• The United States 
in private discussions with Pakistan had won agreement for 
serious consideration of substantial autonomy for East Pak-
istan •••• This was conveyed to the Indian Ambassador, Laksmi 
Kan Jha, on November 19, •••• Mr. Jha was told that the Pak-
istanis were prepared to discuss a precise time table for 
political autonomy for East Pakistan •••• But on November 21, 
the Indians launched their first aq:.ack •••• After the fighting 
began on November 21, the United States withheld assigning 
blame because it was reluctant to believe that India had come 
to a naked recourse to force •••• India had expanded into an 
all-out war, what was essentially an internal Pakistani 
matter.52 
Another indication that India sought to dismember Pakistan was of-
fered by Charles W. Br"ay, spokesman for the United States Department of 
50Ibid. 
51Ibid. 
52Ihid. 
State. He stated the following:_ 
Specifically, India had rejected a concerted American effort 
to reduce tensions along the borders with Pakistan ••• when· 
Mrs. Gandhi wa~ here early last month, Mr. Nixon told her 
that the Pakistanis were willing to withdraw their troops 
from the border areas, bu§ s.he refused to make any commit-
ment on behalf of India. 5 
54 On December 8, Bhutan had recognized Bangladesh. Thirty members 
of the Indian Parliament demonstrated outside the American Embassy be-
cause of ·the United States' support for a cease-fire to be instituted 
by the United Nations. Thi.s indicated a strong support for the inde-
d f E Pk . d . d ·1· ' 55 pen ence o ast a istan an· continue mi itary action. 
By December 7, India controlled over half of East Pakistan •. Its 
forces were closing in from all sides and were demanding surrender of 
56 Pakistani forces in major strongholds. B.y December 9, most of. East• 
Pakistan's cities were taken or neutralized and the Pakistani military 
. . 57 
within East Pakistan was in massive retreat.· Arrangements were being 
made by Indian officials to remove neutrals from Dacca, the capital of 
East Pakistan. The Indian generals were .. demanding a surrender of all 
Pakistani forces and warned that if they.did not, they would ~eet cer-
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tain death. 
By this time, the only Pakistani force that was a military threat 
to Indian advances was located in D_acca. The Pakistani air force had 
53Ibid., December 7, 1971, p •. 1. 
54Ibid., December 8, 1971, P· 1. 
55Ibid. 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid., December 9, 1971, p. 1. 
58Ibid., December 8, 1971, P• 1 •. 
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lost twenty-five per cent of all .its combat aircraft, and tank losses 
were reported at .. 16A.. By Decemb.er 10, the .I.ndian generals were noting 
only light resistance _f.rom the Pakistanis and one stated: "They are not 
fighting like the Pakistanis of 1965.1159 .On the Indian side, morale was 
extreme,ly high and the Indian troops. were well-received by the inhabi-
tants of East Pakistan. 
After seven days of fighting, India I s military had achieved complete 
air, sea, and ground superiority. Fareigners were evacuating Dacca, and 
·-... the drive to the capital city had begun by the Indian military. There 
were reports that Pakistani soldiers were attempting to chance into 
civilian clothes to escape from confrontations with the Indian military. 
The situation was so grave for Pakistan that .it accepted a United States' 
plea in the United Nations for a cease-fire, but India continued to re-
ject it. 60 By December 11, reports were· coming from West Pakista~ that 
East Pakistan would fall to India in a few days. A correspondent for 
'.The New York Times reported that the Pakistani officials believed that 
India would stop short of nothing hut a complete, unconditional surren-
. 61 
der, and they had become resigned t.o the loss of East Pakistan. 
Up to this point, the Indians had not only seriously crippled Pak-
istani military forces in East Pakistan, but had also indicated·· serious 
damage in West Pakistan. The port of Karachi was blockaded by Indian 
ships,. fuel supplies wer.e getting low, and oil depots were bombed. Be-
cause of the selected bombing, som~ Western experts believed that India 
59Ibid., December 9, 1971, P~ 1. 
60Ibid ., December 11, 1971, P• 1. 
61Ibid., December 12, 1971, P• 1. 
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was capable of destroying Pakistan's economic potential, 
On December 12, I~dia initiated . .a. three~pronged attack on Dacca, 
60 
the Pakistanis I only stronghold., . T.hey .r.an into stiff res~stance for the 
first time in the war. The I.ndian generals .demanded .a surrender of Pak-
. 63 istani forces in an attempt to avoid a pitched battle for Dacca. By 
December 15, the Indian drive to Dacca forced the cormnander of Pakistani 
forces in Dacca to ask for a cease-fire,. a face-saving condition short 
of surrender. Indian generals, 'however, were demanding a complete sur-
render and then a repatriation to follow a final peace settlement with 
P k . 64 a istan. On the last days of the fighting, India launched an amphibi-
ous operation on the city of Dacca, the first of its kind in the war. 
This was an extension of India's professional tactics in launching co-
ordinated attacks of helicopter·assaults, drops of paratroopers, and 
naval blockades. On the following. day, the .Pakistan Eastern Cormnand .sur-
. 65 
rendered to the Indian cormnander of·the eastern forces. India also set 
a time for the cease-fire in the western zone without any agreement from 
P k . 66 a istan. 
The Indian Parliament rejoiced over th~ surrender when it was an-
nounced by Mrs. Gandhi. She ordered a cease-fire on the western front 
and took advantage of the emotional response to announce the political 
objectives of her military strategy. She stated: "We have •• ,no 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid., December 14, 1971, P• 1. 
64ibid., December 15, 1971, P• 1. 
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. Ibid., December 17, 1971, P• 1. 
66Ibid., December 16, 1971, P• 1. 
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territorial ambitions ••• now that Bangladesh is free ••• it is pointless ••• 
. 67 to continue the present conflict." 
With this success dh the battlefield, India went about its plan to 
l 
force other agreements. A senior Indian official stated: "There are 
many matters to be negotiated between the Bengali. mov.ement and Paki-
68 
stan." One important matter to be negotiated was the release of Sheik 
Mujibur, the only man that could bring. order to the devasted posture of 
East Pakistan. Mujibur was released in early January, 1972, and he took 
69 
control of the "friendly" state of Bangladesh. 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid. 
69Ibid., January 9, 1972, p. 1. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In an attempt to understand the relationship between the possession 
of a high level of military power and the motivation of a state to use it 
to achieve critical political objectives, this thesis was undertaken to 
analyze India's decision to use force in the Inda-Pakistani crisis of 
1971. This study proposed to clarify the threefold relationship between 
a rtation's war potential, its political objectives, and its motivation to 
use force in achieving its political objectives. Particular attention 
was given to two general areas which have not received adequate attention 
by other writers who have written about the war. First, is the relation-
ship between the recently acquired pos"ition of military power by India 
and India I s subsequent high motivation to us,e its power against Pakistan. 
Secondly, are the internal political conditions during. 1971 which were 
manipulated by India I s leadership .to bolster the nation I s war potential 
to bring about a high motivation for war. 
From the standpoint of methodology Lovell's .strategic peripective 
model for foreign policy analysis provided the general analytical frame 
of reference for the thesis. It was necessary to assume that the Indian 
leaders had reacted rationally to the Chinese threat since 1962 and dur-
ing the course of the conflict in 1971 •... The term rational as used in 
this investigation is defined as follows: "An action is rational to the 
extent that it is correctly designed t.o maximize goal achievements given 
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the g.oaL in question and the real world as it exists~" 1 More specifi-
caLLy, it was assumed that during.. this period the Indian leaders de-
veloped diplomatic and military .strategies .that required an analysis of 
various alternative courses of action. 
The principal hypothesis of this study was that a high level of 
military capability combined with .expectant major net gains from fighting 
provide a strong motivation ·for war. The methodology used in testing 
this hypothesis consisted of, first, illustrating India's high level of 
military capability and then relating it to India's political abjectives 
and subsequent motivation to use force in 1971. 
The first sub-hypothesis used in this investigation related India's 
rapid increase in war potential to a subsequent motivation to use forc;e 
in the 1971 war. India's motivation to use force was high because. it had 
suffered a traumatic military defeat in the 1962 war with China and had 
subsequently conmitted its res.ources to the development of military 
power, The East Pakistan problem offered an opportunity to assert this 
power. 
In clarifying the first sub-hypothesis, particular attention was 
given to the ·rap,.id change in power contintuents of India since the 1962 
war with China. Standard categarie.s w~re ... u.sed to account for resources 
useful for war which would yield. s.imi.Lar re.suLt-s to anyone who might wish 
to repeat the study. Standard categaries were also used in comparing 
the wa:t potential of both India and Pakistan. .Others may wish to use a 
. 
more definitive list and ga into greater detail in an effort to more 
precisely determine the tatal war patential of the two countries. 
1 Alan C. Issak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Illinois, 
1969) , p. 120. 
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The study alse put emphasis on mab.i.liz.ed military force rather than 
petential . military strength .. ,b.e.cause .s.usta,ir1ed military capability is 
mere important in long sustained wars and.:-P,l.ays a small part in quick de-
cisive wars. Also, there was no great attempt to distinguish between 
capabilities of the different types of military equipment. For the most 
part, only broad categeries were used such as tanks, aircraft, and ships. 
A mere detailed analysis. would produce greater clarification of the war 
potential ef the two ceuntries. Later in the analysis other relevant 
elements of the war potential were emphasized such as diplomacy and 
propaganda. Mrs. Gandhi. demonstrated skill in forming an alliance with 
the Soviet Unien and in neutralizing the alliances of Pakistan. 
This study produced three significant findings which provided in-
sight into how a state can combine various elements of power at the dis-
posal of the leadership and increase its war potential. First, India 
possessed an unquestionable superiority in terms of military hardware 
and was militarily more powerful because of its capacity to adapt its 
strategy and military strength. to the .sp.ecific conditions of the war in 
1971. S.econd, the Soviet.-Indian treaty enhanced India 1 s position of 
power by allowing the Tndian leaders. to make. a rational estimate of th~ 
scale of the war effort needed for a qui.ck decisive victory over Pakis-
tan without including the possibility of a major intervention by the 
United States or China. Third, the subsequent effect of the rapid change 
in Indian mobilized strength was the capability of the Indian military 
to initiate hostilities in East Pakistan and terminate actien after 
achieving the desired results and then resume its pre-conflict military 
posture without interference. The limited military effort required by 
India in achieving its military objectives in East Pakistan provided a 
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strong motivation for war. Spec.ifically, the strategy of the Indian 
military throughout the fourteen day war attested to high motivation and 
confidence in achieving its military objectives. 
These findings coincide with theg.taneral comments of other writers 
on the capability of India prior to the 1971 war. Mehrunnisa Hatim 
Iqbal attributes India's military success to, Indian superiority in equip-
ment, personnel, intelligence, and strategy. 2 Robert H. Donaldson at-
tributes the success to the Indian-Soviet treaty. 3 Both authors, how-
ever, fail to explain how the conversion of India's war potential into 
fighting power came about which is central to the hypothesis of this 
study. 
The second sub-hypothesis of this study related India's political 
objectives to a motivation to use force. India resorted to force against 
Pakistan in East Pakistan because it envisioned an opportunity, with the 
support of the Soviet Union, to become politically and militarily domi.-
nant in South Asia. Under the cloak of "self-defense" India desired to 
eliminate the long-term military threat of Pakistan and to build a secur-
ity system that could stand against any possible advance into the region 
by the People's Republic of China. 
From the standpoint of methodology particular attention was given 
to India's cost-gain estimates in the war, which were bas·ed on identifi-
able patterns in past Indian foreign and domestic policy. The investiga-
tion into India's defense policy since 1962 clarified the determination 
2Mehrunnisa Hatim Iqbal, "India and the 1971 War with Pakistan," 
Pakistan Horizon (First Quarter, 1972), p. 28. 
3 Robert H. Donaldson, "India: The Soviet Stake in Stability," 
Asian Survey (June, 1972), p. 486. 
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of the Indian leaders to initiate a new defense program which would ul-
timately pose a credible deterrent to China. The study found that since 
1962 the Indian nation had consistently maintained a high level of de-
fense spending, had expanded its military forces to almost twice its 
1962 figures, had converted major civilian industries into companies 
which subsequently produced military equipment, and had received large 
quantities of military aid from other states. These developments, in 
effect, reflected the Indian government I s willingness to endure the cost 
to the Indian economy and to build a security system that could quickly 
convert war potential into fighting power. 
With respect to Pakistan, the study identified particular Indian 
objectives in the war and emphasized how these objectives were related 
to the long-term domestic goals of India. This condition allowed the 
Indian leadership to maximize India's war potential, which included the 
motivation to use force. The objectives, as stated by both political and 
military leaders, were the liquidation of the Pakistani Eastern Connnand 
and the establishment of the exil~d B¥1ngla government in power over East 
Pakistan. 
These objectives suggested the possibility that the Indian leaders 
knew to what extent Pakistan would be crippled by the division of the 
state. A calculated effort by the Indian government to use military 
force to achieve the division of Pakistan promised the reduction of Pak-
istan's military and economic power to a permanent position of inferior-
ity vis~a-vis India. Moreover, a quick military victory offered the 
specific opportunity to correct a serious economic problem created by 
the refugees and to build a more acceptable Indo-Pakistani relationship--
a relationship based on Indian regional dominance, which would increase 
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the strength of the Indian government to face the problems of economic 
recovery and effect an immediate repatriation of the refugees back to 
East Pakistan. Immediate post-war initiatives, which included the with-
drawal of all Indian forces, the repatriation of the refugees, and the 
establishment of the exiled Bangla government in power, suggest that 
these conditions were considered in the planning stages of the war. 
In pinning down the relationship between India's recently acquired 
position of power vis-a-vis Pakistan and its cost-gain- estimates in 
planning the war to motivation to use force the first problem was de-
fining motivation and, secondly, measuring India's motivation during the 
war. 
Motivation for purposes of this investigation was defined as the 
will to fight. Even though emphasis was initially put on capability, it 
was never assumed that capability and motivation were synonymous, al .. 
though it is realized that they are mutually supportive. The methodology 
used in this analysis treated Indian motivation to use force as an ex-
pression revealed through governmental policies leading up to and during 
the 1971 war. The three factors mentioned in the introduction provided 
the framework for analysis. The methodology required primarily, a two-
fold premise that action results from motivation and that, motivation de-
termined the behavior of the Indian leaders in 1971. This facilitated 
the investigation and allowed the study to focus on the degree, manner, 
and speed of the Indian war moDsilization from March, 1971, through the 
. 
end of the conflict in December, 1971. Particular attention was given 
to the political leadershiP' of Mrs. Gandhi and her military leaders in 
demonstrating the s,kill with which they brought about the mobilization 
of the Indian nation. Emphasis was given to the manti.er in which they 
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enhanced their military capability and skillfully developed a strategy 
which maximized India I s war potential. 
With respect to the principal hypothesis, it was through the po-
litical process that the three-fold relationship between military capa-
bility, political objectives, and motivation to use force was realized. 
The study found that the behavior of the Indian political and military 
leaders and inhabitants of West Bengal was highly conducive to a war 
situation during the months leading up to the war. It was also found 
that, while much of the behavior of the inhabitants in West Bengal and 
elements within the military in support of the refugees and insurgents 
was beyond the control of the Indian central government, it was through 
governmental decisions that these intense developments were eventually 
related to a war situation. This was accomplished by substituting a com-
mon goa.1' 1 .. for both the inhabitants of West Bengfil and the military, which 
' 
brought about an increased motivation to use force and facilitated the 
mobilization of the country for conventional war. The political and 
military obJectives, the defeat of the East Pakistan Command, and the es-
tablishment in power·of the exiled Bangla government rrovided a set of 
common goals for both groups. 
Motivation was also created within the Indian public, the broader 
military establishment, and the administration by strategic shifts in 
Indian policy from caring for the refugees and protesting Pakistan's be-
havior in East Pakistan to using military force to divide Pakistan, dur-
ing the months leading up to the war. This strategy was realized by Mrs. 
Gandhi's use of diplomacy, propaganda, and military power. One of the 
findings of the study was the skill with which Mrs. Gandhi brought about 
an identity of military objectives with political objectives. Within 
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enly fourteen days of fighting and with a p.z:ecise calculation of milita;ry 
farces required, she achieved .t.he-.d.es,tr.uction of Pakistan I s position in 
East Pakistan and established a "friendly" government ta her east. 
With regard to West Bengal, the streng regional identity ameng the 
inhabitants of East and West Benga,1, which .resurfaced in 1971, and the 
"unselfish" support rendered by the inhabitants of West Bengal to the 
refugees and guerrillas of East Pakistan provided a basis for concern· 
by the Indian leaders that a successionist movement within West Bengal 
might take place. However, additional research i~ needed to test the 
contentien that the crisis of 1971 brought about collusion between po-
litical leaders ef East and West Bengal that would support that portion 
of the hypothesis that states that the Indian leadership responded force-
fully in East P,akistan to prevent elements in West Bengal from joining 
the Bangla movement and possiblY.: taking West Bengal out of the Indian 
nation •. The pr.oblem ef political instability in West Bengal studied by 
Marcus Franda and an updating of his factual material by recent articles 
from ~ New York Times provided ev.id.ence that Indian leaders sought 
major political and econemic . .gains. i.n W.est Bengal in bringing a hasty 
conclusion to the crisis. The New Congres.s gevernment in West Bengal, 
which already faced serious problems .of economic and political irtsta-. 
bility, was further strained by heightened revolutionary tactics from the 
N~~alites, disruptions caused by the inhabitants of West Bengal in sup~ 
port of the refugees and insurgents, and the existing economic preblems 
aggravated by the refugees. It was in the Indian national interest to 
assist the newly established West Bengal government in solving problems 
which threatened the stability and cohesiveness of the Indian nation. 
The methodology used involved searching threugh books written about 
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the area and reading r.ecent newspapers to, detect whether statements had 
been made which were sympathetic to a successionist movement. Marcus 
Franda was the only writer who implied that Indian and East Pakistani 
"strategists" did exist who believed that the only solution to the po-
litical instability in the region was the creation of a united Bengal. 
On the other hand, according to the Institute of Conflict based in Lon"'! 
don, the Naxalites, West Bengal's primary revolutionary group are po-
. 4 litically divided and are not advocators of such a policy. M. Rashi-
duzzman asserts that the younger leaders of the Awami League, the ma-
jority political party in East Pakistan at the time of the conflict, did 
not want to become too dependent on popular Indian support in West Ben-
gal and did not support the ideas of the older leaders who took refuge 
5 in West Bengal during the conflict. The fact that the people of ~est 
Bengal and East Pakistan belong to the same Bengali community promises 
greater cultural cooperation between the two areas, but this will not 
necessarily lead to a demand for politicaL unification of the two en-
tities. 
The methodology used in demonstrating a motivation to use force 
within India also depended partly on post-war results. Even though 
post"'!war results were suggestive, the conditions found within India 
which attest to a high motivation were independent of post.,war results. 
A similar analysis using a different model would perhaps use si~ilar 
facts but might produce different interpretations. This study of 
4 . Brian Crozier, Annual of Power in Conflict 1971 (London, 1972), P• 
53. 
5 M. Ras.hiduzzman, "Leadership, Organization, Strategies, and Tactics 
of the Bangladesh Movement," Asian Survey (March, 1972), p. 189. 
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motivation to use force is the major contribution of this paper to the 
e:Kisting literature written on the war. Other writers, such as Ashok 
6 7 l<.apur and Rmashray Roy, assert or imply the conditions which existed 
before the war without.providing proof of their existence. Also, it ap-
pears that they assumed, without factual evidence, India's superior po-
sition of power and its motivation to use force in the conflict. A 
quick historical scanning of the war potential of India and Pakistan 
would attest to the dilenuns that even though India has always possessed 
a military edge over Pakistan, it has not enjoyed a decisive military 
success over its opponent. This perhaps demonstrates the importance of: 
morale and timing in the war potential of a nation. 
Another contribution of this thesis is some clarification of the 
role of the Indian military in the exercise of Indian policy. 
India's military prior to 1971 provided a defensive function vis-a-vis 
Pakistan and China. The defensive function vis-a-vis Pakistan was re-
placed by an aggressive function in the war of 1971. A calculated mil-
itary effort allowed India to achieve foreign policy objectives long 
sought by Indian leaders. India gained in its position of power vis-a-
vis China by demonstrating its capability in converting its war poten-
tial into fighting power and exhibiting the nation's willingness to use 
force under certain conditions. 
6Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance," 
Asian Survey (June, 1972), pp. 463-474. 
7Ramashray Roy, !!India 1972: Fissure in the Fortress," Asian 
Survey (February, 1973), pp. 242-243. 
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Figure 2. Army Tanks 
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Figure 3. Navy Ships 
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Figure 4. Combat Aircraft 
Aircraft 
Country SS fighters Subsonica Trainers 
Asi-a Austr-alia L L L 
China p L 
India L L 
Japan L p 
1-totes: 
Transports Helicopter.s SAM 
L L L 
L L 
L L L 
Missiles 
ATGW 
p 
p 
L 
p 
A'SM/ 
AAM 
? 
PL 
*Countries other than the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France wh~ch are considered to be 
primary producers. 
+SS= Supersonic. 
P = Arms of producer country's own design. 
L = Arms produced or assembled, not of own design. 
Most aircraft come in this category because the engines are licensed. 
:AU fighter, bomber or COIN aircraft except where indicated. 
Includes ASW missiles. 
c dincludes MCM and landing ships 
Includes landing craft. . 
e fincludes armoured car, scout car and APC. 
Includes Tu-16 medium bomber. 
glnc ludes Japanese designed MR aircraft. 
Source: Institute of Strategic Studies,~ Military Balance, 1970 and 1971, p. 96. 
Figure 5. Secondary Arms Producers* 
Shies Artillery Tanks 
Country Submarines Escorts e PBd SP Towed Medium Lighte 
Asia Australia L p 
China p L p p L p 
India L L p L 
Japan p p p p p p p 
Notes: 
*Countries other than the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France which are considered to be 
primary producers. 
+SS = Supersonic. 
P = Arms of producer country's own design. 
L = Arms produced or assembled, not of own design. 
Most aircraft come in this category because the engines are licensed. 
:All fighter, bomber or COIN aircraft except where indicated. 
Includes ASW missiles. 
c dincludes MGM and landing ships. 
eincludes landing craft. 
fincludes armoured car, scout car and APC. 
Includes Tu-16 medium bomber. 
glncludes Japanese designed MR aircraft. 
Sourceg Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1970 and 1971, p. 96. 
Figure 6. Secondary Arms Producers* 
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Figure 7. Comparative Military Strength of the Two Countries in Novem-
ber, 1971. 
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